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Scientific impact and subjective interest 
For the author, the choice of the theme presented itself as a fundamental topic for clinical 
practice, academically linear to his previous studies and an intuitive choice.  
A contemporary understanding of the core of schizophrenia, consistent with various 
neurobiological translational evidences is fundamental, and probably the most important 
contribution from phenomenological psychopathology. These phenomena occur in 
Schizophrenic subjects, in their first episode of psychosis, in their prodromal phases and 
even in Ultra-High-Risk phases. The reputation of this topic stands upon 3 stalwarts: (1) it 
convenes a new conceptual halo for what it is like to have schizophrenia; (2) it illuminates 
the subjective world of these patients (how they experience) and (3) it might allow early 
diagnosis and its primary prevention. Yet most importantly its importance stands due to its 
linear application in clinical practice, with no need for imaging procedures, for learning a 
particular language (same as the psychopathological examination) and because it is easily 
taught – having a well-defined epistemology. 
It is academically linear. It flows directly from (1) a 3-year Master in Philosophy and 
Psychiatry where the Master thesis was a selective review of literature under the topic 
“Appraising Basic-Self Disorders: A Plea Against the Copenhagen Hypothesis” and (2) a 
training in the Institute of Psychiatry and the OASIS (Outreach and Support Lambeth, 
Southwark, Lewisham & Croydon) with Ultra-High-Risk subjects (UHR).  
Yet most importantly, it was an instinctive choice. The practical uses of Anomalous Self-
experiences as risk bearers of schizophrenia troubled the author as he had experienced many 
of these experiences and schizophrenia had not been diagnosed. Furthering the knowledge 
on the subjective experiences in UHR and anxious disorders provides detail into the 
“disparities” and “affinities” that these subjects present vs schizophrenia. Therefore, by 
fostering the specificity of ASE for schizophrenia spectrum disorders or identifying 
particular subsets is of key relevance for the use of this model in adolescence and Ultra-
High-Risk subjects. In these situations, anxiety is very frequent and could account for 
psychotic-like experiences or derealisation and depersonalization experiences – similes of 
ASE and therefore a confounding element.  
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He believes this research makes a crucial contribution to furthering the understanding 
of an important dimension of psychopathology in the realms of both the schizophrenia 
spectrum and anxiety disorders. The manuscript has been prepared according to the Centro 
Académico de Lisboa style specifications and requirements. The author declares no conflict 
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General Abstract 
This thesis investigates Anomalous Self-Experiences (ASE) testing new ways of their 
symbolization (e.g. Truman Symptoms), extending the detail of their subsets (e.g. abnormal 
bodily experiences) in Ultra-High-Risk (UHR) and further isolating them in new settings, 
such as anxiety disorders. The first aim was to study Truman Symptoms (TS) including their 
presence in UHR, their clinical implications and their relation with ASE. The second aim 
was to study the Abnormal Bodily Phenomena subset of ASE in UHR and to determine their 
clinical implications. The third aim was to identify if ASE occurred in Panic Disorder, to 
characterize their profile in this category considering possible differences from 
schizophrenia.  
Anomalous Self-Experiences are the most important contemporary conceptual and empirical 
research topic in the field of Schizophrenia. The set of these subjective phenomena 
constitutes particular traits of schizophrenic subjects which are present in the 1st episode of 
psychosis, in prodromal and in Ultra-High-Risk states. Outstandingly, such enquiries have 
raised the standard of the psychopathological examination as they’ve endorsed reconsidering 
subjective phenomena to increase validity of a psychiatric category without sacrificing 
reliability. This constituted the first step to sanction a new set of enquiries which contemplate 
other subjective phenomena in schizophrenia and also recognize the possible role of 
psychopathology of subjectivity in other disorders. This thesis stands upon the latter 
phenomenological entreaties in three separate approaches. 
It starts by taking on Truman Symptoms, a contemporary way of symbolizing 
depersonalization/derealization experiences, to identify their relevance in UHR and 
considering their relation with ASE. TS seem to represent a fresh cultural symbolization of 
the initial phase of psychosis and yet no empirical enquiry has set their bearing in the risk of 
psychosis, found possible analogies to ASE or a relation with other clinical measures. It 
continues by addressing the subset of bodily ASE, of which the relevance in a schizophrenic 
sample has been recently reconsidered. Deploying a new instrument – the Abnormal Bodily 
Phenomena Questionnaire – it examines the UHR states drawing the relation of these unique 
subjective elements with established ASE and other clinical measures.  
 16 
Lastly it probes the presence of ASE in a well-established, almost archetypal, nosological 
category of anxiety – Panic Disorder – aiming to contribute to the characterization of the 
psychopathological forms of their subjectivity. Such enquiry seems fundamental to the use 
of ASE in UHR populations where anxious settings are extant and therefore identifying 
particular clusters which could be representative of more severe disturbances of “basic-self” 
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Resumo em Português 
Perturbações do Self-Básico para lá da Esquizofrenia: Estados de Ultra-
High-Risk e Perturbação de Pânico 
Esta tese representa uma parcela do esforço atual no âmbito translacional da fenomenologia 
na sua aplicação translacional para as classificações tendo como objetivo recuperar o 
significado clínico das experiências subjetivas no diagnóstico e intervenção terapêutica da 
esquizofrenia e Perturbações de Ansiedade. Desde o DSM-III que a procura de fiabilidade 
favoreceu os sintomas objetivos e a operacionalização progressiva das categorias 
psiquiátricas traduzindo-se numa abordagem simplicista da complexidade da experiencia 
humana. Isto originou vários problemas de validade dos sintomas utilizados e conduziu a 
limitações graves à psicopatologia e nosologia da Psiquiatria. Em particular salienta-se o 
facto desta tese se centrar na tentativa de encontrar um core para a esquizofrenia – hoje uma 
categoria heterogénea construída por vários consensos e com grande variabilidade 
relativamente aos sintomas inaugurais. O paradigma de perturbações do Self, tão importante 
para a esquizofrenia e tal como utilizado nesta tese, inscreve-se desde contribuições seminais 
até aos estudos mais recentes na área (quer clínicos quer translacionais). A natureza das 
perturbações do Self como “traço” condicionou a sua utilização para lá dos diagnósticos de 
psicose e esquizofrenia considerando-se a sua presença em estados prodrómicos e Ultra-
High-Risk. De facto, após estes desenvolvimentos, novos cluster de sintomas emergiram e 
estão a ser testados como marcadores de Episódio Psicótico, tais como os Sintomas Truman 
e as Perturbações do Self-Básico. 
No entanto, a introdução destes novos componentes na clínica (nomeadamente a sua 
inclusão no exame psicopatológico) depende de mais estudos capazes de os clarificar do 
ponto de vista fenomenológico e clínico. O objetivo fundamental desta tese é procurar 
perceber e caracterizar as experiências anómalas do Self-Básico, em pacientes com P. 
Ansiedade e em indivíduos em estado Ultra-High-Risk para psicose. Em primeiro lugar, 
utiliza-se o novo conceito de Sintomas Truman como uma forma de representar experiências 
anómalas do Self num grupo de Ultra-High-Risk. Em segundo lugar, detalha-se o conjunto 
de experiências anómalas do Self do subtipo corporal, utilizando um questionário próprio, 
Anomalous Bodily Phenomena Questionnaire (ABPq). Por último examinam-se as 
 18 
experiências anómalas do Self numa amostra de doentes com P. Pânico procurando iluminar 
a fenomenologia destas experiências subjetivas na ansiedade e identificar clusters das 
mesmas com maior incidência no espectro da esquizofrenia ou, pelo contrário, aqueles que 
ocorrem em formas patológicas de ansiedade.  
O primeiro braço do estudo compreendeu a prevalência e especificidade dos 
Sintomas Truman numa amostra de pessoas em Ultra-High-Risk. Obteve-se como resultado 
serem um marcador fenotípico destes estados (UHR). O argumento principal consiste em 
que os Sintomas Truman podem ser um sintoma nos estados UHR e contribuir para 
identificar um subgrupo de pessoas que têm psicopatologia mais grave. Nesta amostra não 
se encontrou relação entre os Sintomas Truman e as Perturbações do Self ou mesmo com a 
despersonalização em geral (medida pela escala de Despersonalização de Cambridge) mas 
especulou-se que poder ser um falso negativo em face da reduzida dimensão da amostra 
estudada. Tendo-se registado uma significativa correlação entre a Escala de 
Despersonalização de Cambridge e a escala Examination of Anomalous Self Experiences 
considerou-se a necessidade de atender as “Perturbações da Experiência do Self” de 
experiências de despersonalização e desrealização sem outra especificação. Uma 
sobreposição limitaria o uso de narrativas de experiências de desrealização e 
despersonalização para determinação de experiências anómalas do Self, uma vez que estas 
seriam transnolosológicas e não teriam um significado para o diagnóstico de esquizofrenia.  
No segundo estudo em que se avaliaram Experiências Corporais Anómalas na 
população de Ultra-High-Risk, foi possível encontrar várias destas experiências na amostra 
de UHR – saliente-se que 14 em 26 indivíduos as referia de forma proeminente. Isto permitiu 
especular que possam ser também marcadores fenotípicos de vulnerabilidade de psicose. 
Porém, mais de 30% dos indivíduos UHR não mostraram ABP,  o que deu uma robustez 
maior à noção prévia de que estes estados são heterogéneos, incluem várias co-morbilidades 
e podem ser apresentações inaugurais de vários diagnósticos condicionando vários desfechos 
clínicos. A presença de ABP não diferenciou a amostra de UHR em scores das escalas 
SOFAS ou PANSS, e os sujeitos com ABP proeminentes apresentavam um score de 
CAARMS inferior aos restantes. Estes resultados podem resultar de se tratar de uma amostra 
pequena com baixa significância estatística, sendo necessários estudos maiores para 
averiguar o seu significado. Porém podem também significar que o questionário ABPq 
avalia fenómenos diferentes daqueles a  que actualmente se aplica, ou seja, nos de elevado 
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risco de psicose (incluindo os fenómenos corporais na CAARMS). Nesta amostra os 
indivíduos com ABP proeminentes não tinham scores EASE significativamente superiores, 
podendo significar avaliarem aspetos diferentes da experiência do corpo ou apenas um falso 
negativo. 
Os resultados dos doentes com Perturbação de Pânico da amostra mostraram que 
estes experienciam também perturbações do Self-Básico, apresentando valores da EASE 
significativamente superiores àqueles reportados em estudos com doentes com Perturbação 
Bipolar e outras perturbações fora do espectro da esquizofrenia. Foi possível considerar três 
possibilidades: (1) que as Experiências anómalas do Self na Perturbação de Pânico e na 
Esquizofrenia são fenómenos idênticos, tendo a ansiedade grave como denominador 
comum; (2) que as Experiências Anómalas do Self na Perturbação de Pânico e na 
Esquizofrenia são fenómenos idênticos  mas  apenas superficialmente – e que a entrevista 
EASE não é capaz de as distinguir; (3) clusters diferentes de Experiências Anómalas do Eu 
podem ocorrer na Esquizofrenia e a na Perturbação de Pânico, com padrões específicos 
apenas visíveis num exame cuidado e detalhado. Esta investigação permitiu verificar porém 
que determinadas anomalias da experiência do Self são raras na Perturbação de Pânico, 
particularmente aquelas que correspondem a uma distorção profunda na vida subjetiva – no 
plano neurobiológico consideradas como a base da desintegração da perceção em doentes 
com ou em risco de esquizofrenia.  Esta constatação sugeriu que as anomalias da experiência 
do Self encontradas na Perturbação de Pânico pudessem ser de um tipo diferente, 
provavelmente envolvendo fenómenos secundários ou defensivos e formas mais simples de 
despersonalização e desrealização.  
A inferência principal  resultante da análise de resultados da amostra de doentes com 
P. Pânico é a de que possam existir especificidades na expressão da sua ansiedade que eram,
até hoje, desconhecidas. É possível especular que traços e características subjetivas na 
Perturbação de Pânico (que a Psiquiatria desconhecia), possam explicar o porquê de estes 
pacientes não responderem ao tratamento psicofarmacológico inicial e serem referenciados 
a um contexto hospitalar (necessitando de um tratamento específico). Por último, e de acordo 
com os resultados já obtidos inicialmente na amostra de UHR, a existência de correlação 
entre a EASE e a CDS na amostra de indivíduos com Pânico reforçou a relação entre as 
experiências de despersonalização e as anomalias da experiência do Self. Mesmo assinalando 
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a sobreposição dos itens da entrevista, os resultados obtidos reforçam a necessidade de um 
maior detalhe na descrição destes fenómenos. 
Os resultados desta tese são, porém, limitados pelo tamanho da amostra e dois dos 
estudos que a compõe (com amostra de UHR) devem ser considerados como exploratórios. 
Se considerarmos o tamanho da amostra, o processo de seleção dos indivíduos incluídos na 
amostra de Pânico e o facto de terem sido utilizadas só duas clínicas de UHR, devemos 
pressupor que os resultados possam ser positivos ou negativos. Destacam-se outras 
limitações importantes, nomeadamente a falta de estudos de follow-up e a não utilização de 
um grupo de controlo clínico (por exemplo, de Perturbação Afectiva, Perturbação de 
Ansiedade ou de Perturbação  de Personalidade), as quais  sendo ultrapassadas,  permitiriam 
definir melhor (1) a relevância clínica dos sintomas Truman e das anomalias da experiência 
corporal e do Self para os estados UHR bem como (2) as anomalias da experiência do Self 
na Perturbação de Pânico. Por último, não foram avaliados os impactos da utilização de 
drogas ou de substâncias ilícitas que também poderiam influenciar os resultados aqui 
obtidos.  
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Chapter 1: A Selective Review of the Conceptual Field of 
Research 
1. The self and its disturbances
1.1 Seminal contributions to the idea of Self 
The understanding the Self has been a long-lasting pursuit of Philosophy, Psychology, 
Psychiatry and more recently, neurosciences. It is therefore a strong field of translational 
research where the entails of each paradigm are attempted to its conceptual heterogeneity 
and variegated use of the Self in practice (Sass et al. 2011). In Philosophy, the descriptions 
of the Self run from Aristotle’ till today and major philosophers have plunged in its matters. 
The XIX century allowed another stance, from psychology, important as it focuses in 
subjectivity and promotes introspection as clinically important and an instrument for 
collecting data (Sass et al. 2011). In Psychiatry, the Self and its disturbances has been 
particularly explored in many seminal contributions where we find descriptions of mental 
symptoms and mental disorders involving the self as in Pierre Janet, Hans Gruhle, Joseph 
Berze, Eugène Minkowski, Ludwig Binswanger and Wolfgang Blankenburg. In the field of 
Neurosciences, there has been extensive input risen along the last 4 decades and these efforts 
aim to present us with a translational effort from specific disturbances of the self to areas of 
the brain which can constitute disturbances (Kircher & David 2003) (S. Gallagher 2011). 
Tackling the Self in Philosophy brings up the ideas of “self-consciousness” and “self-
reflection”. The former meaning finds its way back to Aristotle’s idea of “memory” – 
knowing oneself by past actions and life and to narrative dimension of self-awareness. The 
second also takes into account the Stoics idea of Phantasiai – the individuation of 
experiences and – hegemonikon – the mineness of experience (Sandbach 1989).  The 
possibility of privately meeting with oneself was presented by Plotinus (Rappe 2007) and 
later by Saint Augustine worked over the concept of “space of retreat”. A major contribution 
was made by Victor Frankl notion of Self that encompassed (1) the presence of double 
structure (being subject and simultaneously object of experience), (2)  the reflexive nature 
consciousness and a (3) sense of familiarity ((Frankl 1975). Yet far before that, Descartes 
notion of res-cogitans would add and revolutionize use of the word Self by the construction 
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mind-brain dichotomies. The discussion thenceforward was now on the nature and properties 
of the empirical (physical) and of the transcendental (mental) self. Considering all the 
contributions is out of the scope of this chapter (but can be found in (Kircher & David 2003; 
Kircher & David 2009)). Yet, to clarify the ideas of Leib and Korper and of the 
transcendental structure of subjectivity Plessner, Buytendijk, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and 
Sartre are revisited in the next sections.  
Plessner was the first to propose the distinction between leib and korper in respect to 
anthropological distinction between animals and humans (see Kruger discussion on the 
origins of the terms (H.-P. Krüger 2010)). Later on, the terms Leib/Leibsein/Leiblichkeit 
used in philosophy by Gernot Bohme, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-ponty to 
affirm the importance of considering what it is “to be” a body. That referred to the capacity 
of subjectively appreciating the body as “alive and living”, its pre-reflexive cognitive and 
affective mode of experiencing of oneself and the world (both immediate and intentional). 
In other words, this way of experiencing oneself is constituted by the “sensorimotor 
subjectivity: a situated, forward-flowing, living organismic body of a suitable degree of 
neurobiological complexity” (Maiese 2011). Paradoxically, while in such a state the person 
is not explicitly aware of him/herself - this state is not reflexive or self-conscious (see further 
discussion in (Carman University of Arkansas Press 1999)). Indeed the conscious experience 
of what it is like “to have” a body constitutes the notion of korper – or – the body-as-
objectively-experienced. It refers to the objectified and physically bound properties of the 
body. Together leib and korper can be portrayed in the movement of one’s left hand to touch 
the right hand – the latter is experienced as physical whilst the first is providing the 
experiential awareness of the other.  
The phenomenological authors also support the possibility of a transcendental structure of 
subjectivity – ontological structure of the perception of reality which includes properties 
such as spatiality, temporality and bodily awareness, self-awareness and other–awareness. 
Merleau-Ponty proposes that these formal pre-reflexive ways of grasping reality lose their 
implicit statuses and become explicit when disturbed (as it could be in the case of mental 
disorders) “of the intentional threads which attach us to the world...when feeble those 
intentional threads (time, body, and immersion in the world) become visible” (Merleau-
Ponty 1962). Here is briefly discussed all but the self-awareness as it is part of the major 
discussion of this thesis. 
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Spatiality as a transcendental structure is not the experience of space (as a phenomenon) but 
the way one is, at each moment, distinctively situated and set in the world. Such is the notion 
of “prenoetic spatiality that is never fully represented in consciousness or captured by 
objective measurement” (S. Gallagher 2006) rather a framework which allows me to see the 
world at-hand in respect to its relation with oneself and one’s body. Spatiality involves 
various forms of being in space (tridimensional, natural orientation, lived, historical, 
humoral space). The concept of hodological space (Lewin 2013) is fairly illustrative of the 
way that factual, topological, physical, social and psychological circumstances affect space 
experience. 
In respect to temporality, a similar discussion is raised on how it is involved in the perception 
of the world. Proposed by Kant, such experience of “time is nothing else than the form of 
the internal sense, that is, of the intuitions of self of the internal state. For time cannot be any 
determination of outward phenomena. It has to do neither with shape nor position, on the 
contrary, it determines the relation of representations in the internal state.” (Kant 2013). If 
“temporality” is adequate then the pre-reflexive involvement in microstructure of experience 
allows for time to flow unrestricted – “every time that we are absorbed in what we are doing, 
and may even reach the climax of “flow experiences” (M. Csikszentmihalyi & I. S. 
Csikszentmihalyi 1992) where the “sense of time is lost in unimpeded fluent performance”. 
Yet also it allows for the perception (of the world) to be “future oriented” and for adequate 
sorting of “before/after relationships” (Wyllie 2005). But one can leave such state, as in 
tedium and boredom where we are forced to become aware of time passing. Further 
disturbances in mental disorders lead to changes in the awareness of lived time (explicit 
forms of temporality) (Fuchs 2005b), to an increased or decreased “availability of the world” 
and even, as in schizophrenia, to novel ways of being in the world (Stanghellini et al. 2015). 
The pre-reflexive bodily awareness involves the previous discussion on “leib” and “korper”. 
Present conceptualization suggests that the body is also involved in “sense-giving” and that 
the perception of reality is beforehand integrated in a corporeal scheme. Such “engaged 
epistemology” is used to apprehend some of the features of delusions which were 
paradoxical if used in the previous estranged understanding of world relation (Gipps & K. 
W. M. B. Fulford 2004). But the bodily pre-reflexive awareness of the world is also related
to the “experience of possibilities” and to the “intentional arc”. 
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The relevance of  intersubjectivity in the ontological structure of reality can be pointed in 
the possibility of synchronization, an eccentric position on reality and a unique form of 
apprehending the body. First, the contact with others allows the subject to become 
“dialectically synchronized“ that otherwise would experience “lived time” detached from 
“the micro-dynamics of everyday contact imply a habitual synchronization… basic feeling 
of being in accord with the time of the others” (Fuchs 2005b). This synchronization not only 
regards time but also all the remaining forms of structure of subjectivity – such attunement 
with the world in general is fundamental. In the second is relevant the ontology of the body-
for-others, the encounter with the other is essential to find an “object-to-subject” relation 
which allows me to “appear/become visible/objectified” - If, therefore, being-looked-at, 
apprehended in all its purity, is no more connected to the body and the Other than my 
consciousness of being a consciousness (in the pure effectuation of the cogito) is connected 
to my own body - then it is necessary to consider the appearance of certain objects in the 
field of my experience (in particular the convergence of the Other's eyes in my direction) as 
a pure monition, as the pure occasion for the realization of my being-looked-at (Sartre 1943). 
This synthetizes this experience of the body as available to the subject.  
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1.2 The Self in Psychiatry 
The Self in Psychiatry has been used epistemologically in the creation of biological and 
psychosocial models for psychiatric categories and also used as constitutive phenomena. 
Drawing from the conceptual heterogeneity, the “disturbances of self” are vast and they are 
used to enlighten complex situations as (1) psychopathology of Schizophrenia (loss of self), 
(2) multiple personality (and other dissociative experiences) and (3) passivity experiences
(also part of experiences in schizophrenia). The first two can be tracked back to Kraepelin 
discussing distinctive conceptions of the disturbances of the self from dementia praecox (5th 
edition), changes in self-awareness (6th edition) and depersonalization and multiple 
personalities (8th edition) – further discussion by Berrios in (Kircher & David 2003)). The 
third was discussed by Bleuler and includes the experiences of “clouding of thoughts”, the 
nosology “twilight state” and the psychological capacity of “self-awareness” (Bleuler 1924). 
Jaspers contributed significantly to the self as psychopathological phenomena by dedicating 
an entire chapter of his “General Psychopathology” to both changes in the awareness of the 
self (allocated in activity, identity and unity) and the disorders of self-reflection 
(disturbances of instinct, bodily function and compulsive phenomena) (Jaspers 1997). 
Scharfetter further detailed such approach to ego-pathology in 5 basic dimensions (vitality, 
activity, consistency/coherence, demarcation and identity) probing their presence in 
empirical studies (Scharfetter 1981) (Scharfetter 1995). Another conceptual concept of the 
meaning of the Self was related with the notion of “coenesthesia” which denoted bodily 
experiences that would not fit within the 5 Aristotelian senses (Reil & Hübner 
1794),accepted as a direct access to perceptual information and to be given the same 
importance as ordinary senses. The relevance of disturbances of the self in schizophrenia. 
1.3 Embodiment and Enacted Knowledge 
Further delving into the disturbances of the self implicates knowing the concepts of 
“embodiment” and “enactment” which today infuse the discussion of “basic self 
disturbances”. They stand upon a critical appraisal that the “neural system” must be more 
than just a sensor / processor of external and internal stimuli. Such understanding is in sharp 
contrast with the “Brainbound model” which has constituted a “Cartesianist” approach to 
brain-body and main model of understanding of human experience and behavior until 
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recently (see (Clark 2008)). Distancing itself from such materialist and dualist accounts, the 
embodied model supposes that the body (beyond the brain) is also sthece of knowledge both 
in the form it assumes and its dynamics. This view is expressed both in seminal works of 
phenomenologists as in Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 1962) and in more specific 
contributions by Lawrence Shapiro, Shaun Gallagher (S. Gallagher 2011), Francisco Varela 
and Evan Thomson (Varela 1993) and Michelle Maiese (Maiese 2015a). They propose that 
(1) the body has a constitutive role in cognitive processing, (2) there is an “engaged 
epistemology” where the bodily shape and form are relevant for assessing and accessing the 
world (S. Gallagher 2006) , (3) the body as the means of a “living mind” – mindedness is 
spread out through the body (Maiese 2015a; Hanna & Maiese 2009). Maiese further clarifies 
that the body entails both “necessity” and “completeness” supporting that “we are always 
and necessarily conscious in and through the living bodies; and it is only complete minded 
animals that are intentionally directed, not their body parts alone, and not even their brains 
alone” (Maiese 2015a). 
 From the ideas of embodiment, one can easily draw the idea of enactive access to the world 
where the brain is (1) not impassively receiving external stimuli in which it cognitively 
elaborates but (2) previously bodily meaningful stimuli and (3) that the body itself creates 
and maintains meanings that are part of the individual identity ((E. Thompson 2007)). This 
particular strand of enactivism (embodied knowledge) was used to characterize the role of 
emotions, moods and existential feelings structuring and informing the person’s sense of its 
relation with the object or situation he’s in. ((Ratcliffe 2008; Maiese 2015b)). As a whole, 
the enactive and cognitive knowledge are complementary in terms that in each situation 
where enactive information (action) fails the cognition takes command.  
As Maiese emphasises, the embodied engagement and enactment seem responsible for a 
“basic sense of self” - constituting both the basis of a living body and the condition of a lived 
body (Maiese 2015a). When the person is able to intuitively navigate and adapt to each 
situation, meaning when in full performance, they also experience a feeling of being and 
their own sense of self.  
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1.4 Louis Sass and the Copenhagen School 
The most relevant operationalization of the self was laid out by Joseph Parnas (Bovet & 
Parnas 1993), Louis Sass (Sass & Parnas 2003) and Dan Zahavi (Zahavi 2008) and was 
further supported by various studies arising in the Center for Subjectivity Research 
(Copenhagen). It includes a theoretical and empirical proposal for the concept of Self that 
comprises an inverted pyramidal structure standing upon “the basic self” – a pre-reflexive 
engagement, enactment and synchronization with the world. Such “basic level of the self” is 
key to understanding schizophrenia and various other authors provided inputs to it, 
particularly Giovanni Stanghellini (Stanghellini 2013) and Thomas Fuchs (de Haan & Fuchs 
2010). The “basic level of self” or minimal self involves the subjective self-experience in 
routine performance which is not available to consciousness and therefore only revealed in 
specific psychopathological conditions. It is part of three levels (basic, reflexive and 
narrative) of self-experience: 
A first level encompasses “the minimal Self” ((Cermolacce et al. 2007; Legrand 2007)) and 
encompasses pre-reflexive experience, meaning and synchronization with others and the 
world. In the core concept are ideas of “ipseity” (a non propositional acquaintance with 
oneself), self-awareness (ecological awareness of the position in the world and awareness of 
the environment), vital feelings (Scheler in (Kircher & David 2009)), “self-affection” and 
affect resonance (possibility for interpersonal synchronization); agency (imbued 
intentionality), and self-continuity (retentional-protentional unity of internal consciousness 
and temporal coherence). The “minimal self” functions as a basic embodied and enacted 
relation with the world relieving the person of much of the effort of relating and 
understanding reality – it works through an intuitive and transparent activity. Disturbances 
in this level make the subject aware of being separate from oneself or of a sense of 
unfamiliarity or unreality of the environment. Also such immediate understanding allows 
the subject to act upon his perceptual experiences without cognitive effort. So beyond 
allowing a “pathic” experiential feature the minimal self refers to a “gnostic” pre-reflexive 
or experiential meaning that imbues experience before any cognitive enterprise.  
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Hierarchically a second level of self materialises, built over the previous, but different in 
nature as the subject is aware of it and willingly uses this level for himself. It includes 
functions of self-reflection: ability to build judgments and beliefs (not only cognitive) on 
oneself and the world; of building of a body image: the reflexive concept of oneself; and 
perspective taking – the possibility to take an alocentric assessment of reality (Raballo 2012). 
Disturbances of such level might occur due to changes in proper thought but also due to 
changes in the other dimensions of self-experience. Examples of these are the descriptions 
of hyper-reflexivity and abstract idealization (“a kind of spiritual or intellectual utopian 
ideology, detached from concrete daily interpersonal life” (Stanghellini 2004) in 
Schizophrenia. 
The third level of the “self” includes notions of cohesive judgments, attitudes and memory 
arrangements that add up to the experience of having a biography and to the possibility of 
portraying oneself through narratives (P. H. Lysaker & J. T. Lysaker 2008; I. Gallagher 
2000) (autobiography). This narrative dimension of Self-concept is expressed in the patient’s 
self-portrayal and set of attitudes. Cognitions and experiences are incorporated in one’s 
experience of time and space. Knowing one’s past and knowing one’s changing 
autobiography leads to a singular type of narrative sense of continuity. The second and third 
level of self-experience can be grouped into the idea of narration. 
Another relevant experiential feature of the self is the physical dimension including Sartre’s 
notion of Korper (see more in (Stanghellini, Ballerini, Blasi, et al. 2014; H.-P. Krüger 2010)) 
and the way we capture the body as corporal (as is studied by natural sciences as anatomy). 
The physical body is many times a background experience that we are not aware of but 
sometimes comes out to the centre and leading us to see ourselves as materialized. It 
becomes explicit when under physical diseases (e.g. influenza) where it resists movement 
and is perceptualized. Similar experiences occur in the experience of shame where rich 
descriptions of reification and exposure detail how the body becomes an object to oneself. 
These ideas have been used to describe many of previously ineffable and incomprehensible 
experiences in Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders (Raballo 2012; Postmes et al. 2014; 
Parnas & Henriksen 2014). For instance (see below for a detailed depiction) the appearance 
of hyper-reflexivity as (1) involuntary process to deal with increased experiential data which 
were previously transparent; (2) primary activation of the mind towards itself because of 
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alienation; (3) defensive compensatory forms to the loss of control over the structure of the 
self. This would lead all to an experience of self-alienation, depersonalization and to 
delusional systems. 
1.5 The inputs from neurosciences 
The descriptive nature of the concepts previously discussed has been gradually transformed 
by subsequent translational studies into a neurobiological paradigm. These efforts are 
supported in several models of psychological development ((Piaget & Inhelder 2008; 
Postmes et al. 2014); (Stern 1998; Rochat 2009)), which materialize the “basic self” in 
crucial sensory and motor functions. It takes up on contemporaneous cognitive science the 
idea that actions and perception are interdependent in the constitution of experience ((I. 
Gallagher 2000; Gallese & Sinigaglia 2010; Merleau-Ponty 2013; Noë 2004)) and that early 
on disturbances of these occur in persons who later develop schizophrenia ((Erlenmeyer-
Kimling et al. 2000; Fis et al. 2008; Schenkel & Silverstein 2004; Sørensen et al. 2010). Yet 
only few studies have delved into these matters: (1) the group of Joseph Parnas (Parnas et 
al. 1996), (2) the group of Postmest (Postmes et al. 2014). Borda and Sass further pin-point 
the shortage of research on the association between schizophrenia-like disturbances of core-
self experience and neuropsychological factors (see more in (Borda & Sass 2015; Sass & 
Borda 2015)). They go further grounding the neurological correlates of primary and 
secondary functions (and experience) of the self. The primary phenomena (disturbed grip on 
the world, primary forms of hyper-reflexivity and primary diminished self-presence) would 
be related with a disturbed organization and integration of perception particularly intermodal 
integration of motoric, proprioceptive, kinesthetic processes (“perceptual dys-integration”). 
Otherwise the secondary forms of disturbed self-experience are related with hypoactivity of 
the central executive network, and hyperactivity of Default-Mode network (DMN) and with 
salience network dysregulation. 
Sass and Borda further detail the neurobiology underlying each of the disturbances of the 
self in schizophrenia: 
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1.5.1 Primary Factors 
The disturbed “grip” or “hold” on the world: deficits in context processing and abnormal 
discrimination between familiar and strange stimuli leading to a perceptual disorganization 
and disintegration ((Martin & Pacherie 2013; Sass 2004)). Disturbances of “Perceptual 
organization” which entail incapacity to structure stimuli ((Uhlhaas & Silverstein 2005) and 
of “Perceptual Integration” which refer to a disturbance of intermodal synthesis (Postmes et 
al. 2014). Both have been found disturbed in schizophrenia samples and ground various 
deficits on these subjects ((Uhlhaas & Silverstein 2005; Phillips & Silverstein 2003; Postmes 
et al. 2014)). Such disturbed evaluation of context and between external and internal stimuli 
leads to an unstable reality that lacks clarity and in which the subject’s feeling of bodily 
presence is severely disturbed 
Automatic or “Operative Hyper-reflexivity” referring to the subject feeling that trifle 
elements of reality become salient and in need of reflection – normal sense of oneself 
requires that consciousness is at least partially turned off. This experience is conceived as 
resulting from a disturbed perceptual intermodal integration (as before) but also, and 
particularly, the inability to “triangulate” all sensory inputs (afferent/body ownership) from 
his self-in-action (efferent/body agency) (Gamma et al. 2014; Jeannerod 2003; Parnas et al. 
1996; Schwabe & Blanke 2007; Tsakiris et al. 2007; Tsakiris 2010; van den Bos & Jeannerod 
2002; Wylie & Tregellas 2010). Neurobiological evidences for disturbance of body 
ownership point to disturbance of bottom-up multisensory integration and areas such as right 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and posterior parietal cortex ((Ehrsson et al. 2005; Tsakiris 
et al. 2008)). These areas together with the somatosensory cortex and the insula are 
responsible for the neuronal representations of a bodily self (see more in (Borda & Sass 
2015)). 
“Primary diminished Self Presence” (diminished self-affection) which refers to the loss of 
being present as living and being a unified subject of awareness or agent of action. It is in 
close relation with the previous two experiences (the subject can no longer take for granted 
his selfhood while so many tacit experiences become salient and explicit) and yet it goes 
beyond the sense of ownership and agency to the capacity to distinguish oneself from others 
((Herrera et al. 2006; Lallart et al. 2009; Riva et al. 2014; Zahorik & Jenison 1998)). The 
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neurobiology of this disturbance are similar to the previous and yet also refer to areas of 
visuospatial organization ((Lallart et al. 2009)).  
1.5.2 Secondary Factors 
Reflective (or secondary) hyperreflexivity refers to another form of overthinking by 
directing attention to what would normally be experienced as part of oneself – moving focus 
from the explicit world to the implicit dimensions of experience. Various negative (removal 
from the world by being too fatigued and therefore inability to attend to reality) and positive 
(derealization) symptoms in schizophrenia are taken as secondary to hyper-reflexivity 
(whether primary or secondary). The Default-Mode Network (DMN) is involved in “self-
referential” tasks and was shown to be active in schizophrenia even when it would be 
naturally suppressed (as in exterior oriented activity). Various medline cortical structures 
were shown to be related to the DMN (R. J. Murray et al. 2012; Northoff et al. 2006; Qin & 
Northoff 2011; van der Meer et al. 2010) and are traditionally considered part of the “neural 
circuitry of self (Brent et al. 2014). Altered salience of interoceptive stimuli could in fact 
explain some of the positive symptoms in schizophrenia such as hallucinatory experiences 
(Manoliu et al. 2014; Jardri et al. 2013). 
Secondary diminished self-presence – it refers to the intentional or defensive process of 
diminishing sense of existing or being an agent of action. This experience seems also related 
to hyperactivation of the Default-Mode Network (DMN) with hypoactivation of Central 
Executive Network and diminished emotional processing of external stimuli – the salience 
network (Moran et al. 2013; Nekovarova et al. 2014; Nygård et al. 2012) – the loss of 
emotions and of feelings of estrangement or detachment from their own mind and body 
(Sierra & David 2011). These changes are interesting both in schizophrenia (considering the 
possibility that psychosis involves severe stress levels and the persistent idea of not being 
able to cope) and in depersonalization post-trauma (either acute or continuous) – all this 
seems to motivate a secondary form of self-objectification and withdrawal.  
Secondary disturbance of “grip” – refers to the incapacity to coherently deal with the 
foreground stimuli – the incapacity to distinguish between relevant and non-relevant stimuli 
and the development of rigid attention and focus. Such has been conceptualized as “the 
abnormal salience hypothesis” where stimuli usually in the background come forward and 
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interfere with those of the foreground – attention becomes disturbed either by the subjects 
inability to focus or becoming abnormally focused on specific stimuli (Fletcher & Frith 
2008) (Kapur et al. 2005; Kapur 2014; Nelson, Whitford, Lavoie & Sass 2014a; Matussek 
1987; Postmes et al. 2014; Hemsley 2005; Hemsley 1976; Hemsley 1998). The ability to 
focus is akin to the capacity to convey objects and persons their affordances (their 
importance in the subject’s experiential world) – see more in (Gibson 2014). It is difficult 
for the subject to navigate in a world where everything is deprived of their personal meaning 
(Sass & Pienkos 2015) and it is the perfect ground for the formation of strange perspectives 
on the world (Sass & Byrom 2015). The dys-regulation of salience network has been 
extensively appraised and appears to involve the Central Executive Network (hypo-activity) 
and Default-Mode Network (DMN) (hyperactivity). This pattern is related with 
unfocused/mind-wandering states and introspection – indeed, introspection in non-
psychiatric conditions has constituted a field of research for psychotic-like conditions (Hunt 
1976; Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013). 
2. Psychosis High-Risk States: A selective Review 
Psychotic episodes are archetypes of severe psychiatric syndromes and of a profound 
disruption of psychosocial development with great personal strain and social and economical 
burden. More significantly, they mark the beginning of severe psychiatric conditions such 
as schizophrenia, bipolar and depressive disorders. Despite numerous advances in treatment 
of these disorders, morbidity and mortality and overall burden are one of the greatest in 
clinical medicine (reference on burden (C. J. L. Murray 1996; Rössler et al. 2005). The rise 
of “high-risk states” pinpoints such measurable risk and has allowed primary prevention 
(along such early detection and intervention) before the onset of a mature syndrome. This is 
a novel approach to severe mental disorders which attempts to change their natural history. 
Research has shown that such is a “uniquely evidence-informed, evidence-building and cost-
effective reform provides a blueprint and launch pad to radically change the wider landscape 
of mental health care and dissolve many of the barriers that have constrained progress for so 
long“ (McGorry 2015). This development has allowed nosological and phenomenological 
enquires in High-Risk states, has highlighted a range of categories and phenomena these 
patients go through and has allowed the trial of assorted preventive interventions. 
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There are various seminal inputs for the possibility of early symptoms of mental disorders 
as Griesinger and Kraepelin respectively “observation shows that most mental disorders are 
first manifested, not by senseless talk or extravagant acts, but by morbid changes of mood 
and anomalies of the self. The earliest stages of insanity consist of an “aimless feeling of ill 
humor (objectlosen Gefiihle der Unaufgelegtheit), discomfort, oppression, and anxiety…” 
(Griesinger 1867) “the beginning of a mental disorder is generally slow… only rarely it 
arises suddenly and is not preceded by a symptom. Notably, small changes along weeks or 
even years are the first and only evidence of an impending mental disorder” (Kraepelin & 
Lange 1927). In the case of schizophrenia there are various other authors focusing on early 
symptoms such as Bumke “the beginning of schizophrenic process is preceded by 
encumbrance, continuous headaches, fatigability and disquiet sleep. Occasionally they 
experience the loss of appetite, palpitations, anguish or vertigo. Other times ananchastic and 
incapacity to reach a decision (…) and hypochondriac complaints (…) patients can feel 
changed and unable to think adequately” (Bumke 1936). Notably, seminal literature on 
Psychosis has also focused in the actual pre-delusional state of mind, evoking good 
representations of what today would characterize a prodromal state (“the augury of 
something or happening” (Fava et al. 2008)). Important depictions include those of Jaspers 
ideas (Jaspers 1963) and of Conrad (Conrad 1958)). For instance, Conrad depiction the 
initial phase of psychosis “trema” was an invasive atmosphere with unaltered perceptions 
and yet an all-together perceptual field imbued with subtle change of uncertainty and threat. 
In these phase they would experience an increased tension “as if there was something in the 
air” and a reduction of their capacity to act upon reality (they felt they could not move or 
decide as before) (Conrad 1997).  
However, most empirical research is traced only to the 60s’ both to European Psychiatry in 
Huber’s concept of basic symptoms ((Schultze-Lutter, Ruhrmann, et al. 2012)) (see below) 
and to American-Australian Psychiatry gather up of data that, two decades later, would serve 
as basis for retrospective early detection studies ((Häfner, Riecher-Rössler, Hambrecht, et 
al. 1992) (Häfner, Riecher-Rössler, Maurer, et al. 1992) (Häfner et al. 1998)) proposing that 
73% of all patients with psychosis had a 5-year’s prodromal phase ((Häfner et al. 1998)). 
Basic Symptoms are subjective disturbances in drive, affect, thinking, speech, perception, 
motor action, central vegetative functions and stress tolerance occurring in psychosis. For 
example, the basic symptom “Thought pressure”, a self-reported ‘‘chaos’’ of unrelated 
thoughts, can be described as follows: ‘‘If I am stressed out my mind gets chaotic and I have 
 34 
great problems thinking straight. Too many thoughts come up at once.’’ Unlike positive 
psychotic symptoms, basic symptoms are not associated with abnormal thought content and 
reality testing and insight is preserved (Gross 1989; Huber & Gross 1989). Longitudinal 
studies on basic symptoms in putatively prodromal patients by Klosterkotter (Klosterkötter 
et al. 2001) supported their very high sensitivity (96%) and high specificity (70%) for 
transition to schizophrenia. 
In the 1990’s in Australia, the criteria for a Ultra-High-Risk group were developed by 
Jackson and Mcgorry (Jackson et al. 1994) and the first clinical service for subjects at risk 
for developing psychosis was created by Yung et al (Yung et al. 1996). UHR criteria includes 
three cohorts of persons as high-risk: the attenuated psychotic symptoms (APS) group, 
including subjects with subthreshold (for intensity of frequency) psychotic symptoms; the 
brief limited intermittent psychotic episode (BLIP) which refers to phenomena that are 
frankly psychotic, but occurring for short periods of time; genetic risk and deterioration 
syndrome [GRD]) group which expresses vulnerability defined through family history of 
psychosis or diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder in the individual couple with  and 
decline in  functioning. 
Important conceptual clarifications include the distinction between initial, precursor, 
prodromal and basic symptoms all of which are used in this field. The concept of early 
symptoms is credited to Bleuler 1955 when portraying early schizophrenia (Bleuler 1950). 
They characterize pre-delusional states as including unspecific and seldom recognizable (1) 
affective symptoms, such as indifference and apathy, (2) obsessive and compulsive ideation 
and (3) “hysteric and neurasthenic” fluctuant symptoms. Prodromal symptoms are attributed 
to Mayer-Gross (Mayer-Gross 1932) and include change in activity, psychasthenic 
complaints and the lack of affective resonance, depersonalization phenomena, compulsive 
symptoms without anxiety, hypochondriac symptoms, compulsive symptoms, whirlwind 
thought processes (manic tonality). Huber and Gabriela Gross by analysing 757 cases of 
schizophrenia depicted precursor and prodromal symptoms (Huber 1985; Gross & Huber 
1985; Huber & Gross 1989; Gross et al. 1987). While “precursor” symptoms preceded 
(months) prodromal phase and psychosis being of limited duration – hours/days (rarely 
months/years) the prodromal symptoms preceded but would continue on during psychosis 
having a fluctuating course. The concept of basic symptoms was laid by Huber (Huber & 
Gross 1989) to describe the subjective experiences lived and depicted by patients in the 
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initial phases of schizophrenia and in post-psychotic states. These included fluctuant 
cognitive, motivational (fatigability, reduction of energy and resistance, reduction in 
activity, indecision / ambivalence) and emotional experiences and the reduction in coping 
capacity (to changes), the will to be with others and patience (experience of irritability and 
discomfort). They also included perceptual disturbances ranging from sight, noise, taste and 
smell or cenesthetic experiences. These symptoms were not specific to schizophrenia but 
present in organic brain syndromes and in melancholic depression. However, a subset of 
basic symptoms has been found to be predictive of subsequent development of psychosis, 
particularly schizophrenia. These include nine cognitive disturbances (COGDIS), such as 
subjective disturbances of thought process (interference, blockages, pressure), as well as 
inability to divide attention, disturbances of expressive and receptive speech, unstable ideas 
of reference and captivation of attention by details of visual field. 
Also it seems important to understand that criteria have aimed to select distinct features and 
that there are two different stances to understand the High-risk states. Interestingly they are 
akin to the bleulerian and schneiderian approach to Psychosis: while the first aims to select 
the “most fundamental symptoms” (BS) the second searches for “most frequent symptoms” 
(UHR criteria). UHR and BS segregate different and complementary cohorts of HR subjects, 
some saying even that BS aim to identify earlier prodromal phases and UHR to detect later 
and clinically more relevant phases (Keshavan et al. 2011; Klosterkötter et al. 2013). Some 
have suggested that their simultaneous use would allow higher significance for transition 
(Fusar-Poli, Borgwardt, et al. 2008). We’ll quickly address the complexity and range of the 
categories used to identify the risk-of-psychosis as it seemed to us a first problem in the 
depiction of their core phenomena.  
A simple approach is to assemble the objective symptoms used in the measures and 
instruments used in the depiction of these disorders. The UHR states are selected by a range 
of instruments that include the Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental State 
(CAARMS); the Structured Interview for Prodromal Symptoms (SIPS) and the companion 
Scale of Prodromal Symptoms [SOPS]); the Early Recognition Inventory for the 
Retrospective Assessment of the Onset of Schizophrenia (ERIraos); the Basel Screening 
Instrument for Psychosis (BSIP) or even a self-rating prodromal scale (Loewy et al. 2005). 
The CAARMS (created in Melbourne in the Personal Assessment and Crisis Evaluation 
(Yung et al. 2005)) and the SIPS/SOPS (developed by Miller et al (Miller et al. 2003)) are 
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Australia and America’s respective equivalents, though both now also being used in Europe. 
The ERIraos assesses schizophrenia onset retrospectively and was created by Hafner et al 
((Häfner et al. 2013)), and it is used in some German and Italian studies. The BSIP was 
developed in the Early Detection of Psychosis Clinic in Basel by Riecher-Rossler et al. 
((Riecher-Rössler et al. 2007; Riecher-Rössler et al. 2008)). For the basic symptoms a 
comprehensive scale has originally been developed: the Bonn Scale for the Assessment of 
Basic Symptoms (BSABS) (Gross et al. 1987). In recent years, a subset of Basic Symptoms 
has been found to be specific to psychosis and associated with transition to psychosis. These 
cognitive and perceptual experiential features can be assessed by the Schizophrenia 
Proneness Instrument, Adult version SPI-A (Schultze-Lutter, Addington, et al. 2007) and 
child and youth version SPI-CY (Schultze-Lutter, Marshall, et al. 2012). Other instruments 
have focused in particular subsets of experiences including self-experiences as the EASE 
(Examination of Anomalous Self-experiences) and bodily experiences as the ABP 
(Abnormal Bodily Phenomena, developed by Giovanni Stanghellini). UHR criteria have 
now a comprehensive volume of research to sustain their clinical relevance and its 
consistency and validity ((Yung et al. 2006) (Carr et al. 2000) (Ruhrmann et al. 2010) 
(Broome et al. 2005)). These include (1) evidences from neurocognitive studies (for 
metanalysis see (Fusar-Poli, Deste, et al. 2012; Woodberry et al. 2008; J Giuliano et al. 2012) 
(2) genetic and imaging studies (for metanalysis see: (Smieskova et al. 2010; Fusar-Poli, 
Radua, et al. 2012; Fusar-Poli et al. 2011), functional (Fusar-Poli et al. 2007) and (3) 
neurochemical imaging studies (Fusar-Poli & Meyer-Lindenberg 2013b) (Howes et al. 2007; 
Stone 2009; Fusar-Poli & Meyer-Lindenberg 2013a). 
A conceptual analysis of HR shows a significant heterogeneity by the fact that these states 
are considered with different epistemic (e.g. having a family history of schizophrenia) and 
phenomenic (e.g. Basic Symptoms and UHR symptoms) (Olsen & Rosenbaum 2006) 
grounds for diagnosis. This chapter focuses in attempting a phenomenological clarification 
of the criteria of UHR and BS. In the former, we focus mainly in the Attenuated Psychotic 
Symptoms group, which constitutes the sub-threshold experiences of a “psychosis at risk 
syndrome”. It the latter we portray the development of the subtle alteration of conscious 
experience described by basic symptoms. Exploring the objective and subjective phenomena 
that these subjects undergo is key to segregate them from general anxious, depressive and 
depersonalization/derealization experiences. 
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An interesting account of UHR and BS is the attempt to further clarify, as in the First Episode 
of Psychosis, if the subject is at risk of schizophrenia. Indeed various sources of these criteria 
are from schizophrenia (including language disturbances, isolation and blunting of affect). 
Despite the fact that UHR criteria were originally meant to identify risk for psychosis 
broadly, research has shown that they are strongly biased towards detection of schizophrenic 
psychosis. A meta-analysis on 23 studies on subjects at risk for psychosis has shown that 
criteria for psychosis risk are biased towards an identification of early phases of 
schizophrenia spectrum rather than affective psychosis: 73% of subjects who transitioned to 
psychosis met schizophrenic spectrum criteria, while only 11% met criteria for affective 
psychosis.  
Recent interest in studying the Bipolar at-risk state has allowed new instruments being 
developed to select subjects at risk such as the Bipolar Prodrome Symptom Interview and 
Scale–Prospective (BPSS-P) (Correll et al. 2014). However, these are not currently routinely 
included in UHR assessment. 
2.1 Attenuated Psychotic Symptoms and Basic Symptoms 
This section assembles and details the phenomena that have been considered both in the APS 
and BS as providing early detection of risk of developing psychosis. Despite the amount of 
research on the presence and reliability of these symptoms we recommend some 
phenomenological apriori premises that should be borne in mind when analysing the 
available literature. First, many of the phenomena that are studied in the HR are transposed 
from full-blown functional psychosis (particularly schizophrenic psychosis) and were 
therefore depicted in psychiatric disorders and not in adolescence or early adulthood. The 
narration of these experiences in schizophrenic and affective psychosis involves the 
coexistent thought and perceptual disturbances that might include changes in the 
psychopathological symbols being used. This leads us to the second suggestion – that the 
“intact insight and reality testing” considered in the HR states is key the psychopathological 
import of derealization and depersonalization experiences. The derealization and 
depersonalization that are deeply imbued in the construct of psychosis rely highly in the fact 
that the person has loss contact with reality as other forms of these experiences are fairly 
common in non-psychotic situations such as in anxiety and adaptive reactions (e.g. delusions 
and hallucinations). So for them to remain valuable in the assessment of High-risk states 
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great care and detail should be taken in the analysis of the phenomena these persons portray. 
And this hints at the last problem: that the concept of psychosis stands for a radical change 
in subjectivity which includes a loss of contact with reality and a heterogeneous range of 
phenomena where thought processes, new bodily and world meanings occur and lead to 
subjective arousal. The phenomena in HR states, by their inceptive nature, are conceptually 
apart from the drastic change of a psychotic state. All three reasons make the 
phenomenological enquiry of these states as stimulating as ambitious and we present the 
state-of-the-art of their study across objective and subjective phenomena.  
2.2 Objective phenomena of HR 
The identification of the objective phenomena occurring in HR states can come from the 
psychiatrist but also by family and friends who identify various behavioral changes which 
are present in a third person perspective. Most of them involve changes in social and 
occupational functioning. Some of these symptoms are identified as negative symptoms 
including being socially withdrawn and presenting autistic features. In addition to (and often 
preceding) attenuated positive symptoms of psychosis, social isolation, impaired 
occupational functioning and difficulties in interpersonal relationship, as well as other 
negative symptoms, are among the main presenting complaints of subjects seeking help and 
meeting criteria for psychosis risk. In fact, impairment in psychosocial functioning is a 
characteristic feature of the psychosis risk state  (Velthorst et al. 2010), associated with poor 
longitudinal outcome (Fusar-Poli et al. 2010). 
Moreover, HR subjects usually present with comorbid diagnoses, such as anxiety, 
depression, and substance use disorders ((Fusar-Poli, Nelson, et al. 2014) (Lencz et al. 2004; 
Fusar-Poli et al. 2013). Multicenter studies on large HR sampled showed that the most 
common positive symptoms are unusual thought content and perceptual abnormalities. 
Regarding negative symptoms, half of HR subjects endorse poor functioning and a 
significant proportion presents decreased ideational richness, while disorganization 
symptoms are less frequently noted. ((Addington et al. 2015). Trouble with focus and 
attention is usually the most common disorganized symptom, whereas dysphoric mood is 
the general symptom endorsed more often (Alderman et al. 2015). Some studies reported 
more severe negative symptoms at presentation, followed by positive, general and 
disorganization symptoms (Ruhrmann et al. 2010; Comparelli et al. 2014; D. Fulford et al. 
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2014; Lee et al. 2014; Velthorst et al. 2009). Amongst negative symptoms, social anhedonia 
is the most common. Suicidal ideation is also present in a significant proportion of patients 
at risk for psychosis. More than half of HR patients has at least mild suicidal ideation, while 
almost half of them have attempted suicide before engaging with an Early Intervention 
Service (Hutton et al. 2011). 
2.3 Why are Self Disorders linked with High-Risk of Psychosis? 
Many, if not the larger part, of the phenomena that constitute APS and “basic symptoms” 
are self-reported and subjective in nature. Some are broad-spectrum and encompassed in 
descriptive psychopathology textbooks including neurotic-like symptoms as changes in 
concentration and attention, reduction of initiative and motivation, general anxious and 
depressive moods and social isolation. This section else focus in subjective phenomena 
specifically referred to these states in accordance to the seminal contributions (see before) 
and to recent reviews  (Yung & McGorry 1996; Klosterkötter et al. 2013). Part of it 
purposely overlaps with that of previous sections – aiming to reiterate the relevance of self 
disturbances as HR factors. Moreover, it details Abnormal bodily Experiences and Truman 
Symptoms as means to operationalize the subjective life of HR subjects. 
2.3.1 Disturbed grip on reality: perplexity, derealization and depersonalization 
phenomena 
Early psychiatric literature portrays the features of impending psychosis as arrangements of 
perplexity, depersonalization and derealisation experiences which are included in the ideas 
of delusional atmosphere/mood ((Jaspers 1963) (Schneider 1959) (Binswanger 1957) 
(Conrad 2013) (Matussek 1952). Such states are depicted as a “psychologically 
irreducible...subtle, pervasive, and strangely uncertain light” - intolerable but vague content 
(sensations, mood)” (Jaspers 1963) and “Sinister and disquieting experience that perceptions 
mean something which is vague but menacing” (Schneider 1959). The perplexed subject is 
depicted as enduring 'the oppressive awareness of one's inability to cope with a given internal 
and external situation, this awareness being experienced as something that cannot be 
explained, something that has to do with one's own self' (Störring 1987) (Storring 1940). 
This subject also undergoes a decrease in the empathic capacity and/or a decline in psychic 
and motor activity and/or a detachment from the world (perception) (Störring 1987). The 
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relation of perplexity with early psychosis is inscribed in seminal contributions as in (1) 
Conrad’s depiction of trema described as a state of hyper-awareness similar to what an actor 
experiences just before entering the stage where reality is saturated with hidden/mysterious 
qualities that strike the subject with an uncanny salience (Conrad 2013) and (2) to subjects 
portrayal of being “at-mercy”(ness) as if “hooked to the perceptual elements” (Blankenburg 
in (Jenner & De Koning n.d.)) or (3) of being enslaved to the world they perceive (Matussek 
P: Studies in delusional perception (translated and condensed in (Cutting 1987))).  
At an abstract level, HR subjects are said to endure a primary form of disturbed “grip” or 
“hold” on the world (Sass & Parnas 2003; Borda & Sass 2015) which involve deficits (1) in 
context processing and (2) abnormal discrimination between familiar and strange stimuli 
leading to perceptual disorganization and disintegration ((Martin & Pacherie 2013; Sass 
2004)). A composite loss of “Perceptual organization” establishes a failure to structure 
stimuli ((Uhlhaas & Silverstein 2005) and of “Perceptual Integration” constitutes a 
disturbance of intermodal synthesis (Postmes et al. 2014). These have been found in 
schizophrenia samples and ground various deficits in these subjects ((Uhlhaas & Silverstein 
2005; Phillips & Silverstein 2003; Postmes et al. 2014)). The HR subject is hypothesized 
losing the ability evaluate of context particularly differentiate external and internal stimuli 
which together constitute their unstable reality (that lacks clarity) and their disturbed feeling 
of presence ((Nelson, Whitford, Lavoie & Sass 2014b; Nelson, Whitford, Lavoie & Sass 
2014a) and below).  
These subjects also endure another form of disturbance of “grip” conceptualized as the 
incapacity to coherently deal with the foreground stimuli. Such impediment leads to a 
disturbed focus and to a rigid attention where relevant and non-relevant stimuli both become 
salient. This was coined “the abnormal salience hypothesis” {Kapur:2003dl} depicting how 
stimuli usually in the background come forward and interfere with those of the foreground. 
It constitutes a form of disturbance of attention where the subject is unable to focus or 
becomes abnormally focused on specific stimuli (Fletcher & Frith 2008) (Kapur et al. 2005) 
(Kapur 2014) (Nelson, Whitford, Lavoie & Sass 2014a) (Matussek 1987) (Postmes et al. 
2014). Such changes occur early on in HR states where the subject complains of losing his 
ability to focus and his affordances (Gibson 2014) – meaning the things that were previously 
important in the subjects experiential world. The HR subject finds it difficult to navigate in 
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a world deprived of personal meanings (Sass & Pienkos 2015) and moreover easily forms 
strange perspectives on the world (Sass & Byrom 2015) he inhabits.  
Some reservations do however remain regarding the use of such “disturbed grip” (and 
consequential depersonalization and derealization) as a marker of the risk of psychosis. They 
stand on these experiences being phenomenological complex (Simeon et al. 2008),(Simeon 
& Abugel 2008) allowing for different forms. Moreover, depersonalization/derealization are 
also the third most common psychopathological symptom (after anxiety and depressive 
mood) occurring in non-schizophrenic pathologies, in normal adaptive reactions to anxiety-
provoking situations or even as voluntary responses (e.g., in introspection or meditation 
(Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013)). It would then be possible that anxiety disorders, depressive 
disorders (Brauer et al. 1970) and Depersonalization Disorder (Simeon et al. 1997)) could 
have their own constitutive forms. Indeed, attempts to break through this phenomenological 
complexity could be helpful in this distinction (Simeon et al. 2008). A simplistic appraisal 
postulates particular forms as (1) a “melancholiform” form depersonalization constituting a 
state of reduced vitality where sensations or emotions are less vivid and (2) a 
“schizophreniform” form of depersonalization that would be traitlike internal distance one 
self which becomes externally observed (one’s own body, mind, thoughts, emotions, 
actions), reflected upon (hyper-reflexivity) and therefore felt with a sensation of alienation. 
Yet it is also possible to conceive that for the latter forms (considered of schizophrenic 
bearing) there could be secondary forms ((Sass 2014) (Borda & Sass 2015; Sass & Borda 
2015) (Hunt 1976), (Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013; Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 2013)). At 
an epistemic level, these secondary or consequential forms would arise as defensive factors 
that occur in but are not distinctive of schizophrenia. Phenomenologically they would be 
akin to the primary forms yet they would occur in the above disorders even have volitional 
(or quasi-volitional) counterparts would take place in introspection or meditation. Indeed, 
and beyond this theoretical consideration, recent studies (Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 2013; 
Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013)) have explored specific patterns that would in term allow the 
clarification of schizophreniform, non-schizophrenic forms (Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 
2013) or even non-pathological forms (Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013) of these disturbances. 
These disturbances in understanding reality are intimately related with three other 
experiences in HR states that are detailed next – an increased preoccupation and cognitive 
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introspection (hyper-reflexivity), a change in the feeling of “presence” and the experience 
of singularity of existence.  
2.3.2 Hyper-reflexivity: (in) voluntary rumination and inward attitudinal stance 
This refers to the complaint of an increasing tendency (volitional and non-volitional) to 
attend to internal processes and to phenomena which were previously tacitly dealt to which 
the subject was not self-conscious (Sass 1992; Sass et al. 2011). The first (and rather 
obvious) explanation for HR subjects’ self-absorption derives from the alienation that their 
states involve – solitude as ground for thinking. Yet, and hinting a possible primary 
involvement in HR states, is that similar self-absorbed configuration of experience is a 
primary feature of Conrad’s depiction of delusion formation – “the subject turns inward, 
reflecting and introspecting upon the most trivial things” (Conrad 2013). Further detail into 
the latter arrangement has conceptualized this as a psychopathological symptom with two 
forms – primary (operative) and secondary (compensatory) – a division which appear to be 
supported by the latest translational studies. 
Automatic or “Operative Hyper-reflexivity” is related with the previously portrayed 
“salience hypothesis” (Kapur 2014) (Roiser et al. 2013) – elements previously in the 
background of the perceptual field become salient and in need of reflection. The subject 
sense of self is disturbed as such – the normal sense of self – requires that consciousness is 
at least partially turned off. Such form of “overthinking” is intimately linked with the feeling 
of being a spectator of one’s experiences – no longer living (being in the world) and rather 
thinking (musing on the world). Sass provides an interesting account of such as a “subtle but 
pervasive replacement of natural engagement in the world with introspective ruminations” 
(Sass et al. 2011). Such is conceived as resulting from a disturbed perceptual intermodal 
integration and also, and particularly, the inability to “triangulate” all sensory inputs 
(afferent/body ownership) from his self-in-action (efferent/body agency) (Gamma et al. 
2014; Jeannerod 2003; Parnas et al. 1996; Schwabe & Blanke 2007; Tsakiris et al. 2007; 
Tsakiris 2010; van den Bos & Jeannerod 2002; Wylie & Tregellas 2010).  
Reflective (or secondary) hyperreflexivity refers to ancillary form of overthinking – aiming 
attention to what would normally be experienced as part of oneself or yet – moving focus 
from the explicit world to the implicit dimensions of experience (these include cenesthetic 
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and proprioceptive experiences). Seminally, this subordinate upsurge in cognitive 
rumination was conceptualized by Blankenburg  (Blankenburg 1971) as a consequence of 
Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit (loss of the natural self-evidential nature of 
anything). Such loss of natural evidence is another link between forms of hyper-reflexivity 
and previously depicted disturbed grip on reality and the feeling of perplexity that imbues 
HR states. Neurobiologically such could constitute the (over) activation of Default-Mode 
Network involved in “self-referential” tasks (Nelson, Whitford, Lavoie & Sass 2014b) (R. 
J. Murray et al. 2012) (Northoff et al. 2006) (Qin & Northoff 2011) (van der Meer et al.
2010), part of the “neural circuitry of self (Brent et al. 2014) and an altered salience of 
perceptions (Nelson, Whitford, Lavoie & Sass 2014a)  
This is closely related with the reduction in the feeling of being present in the world (next 
section) as in all three forms of hyper-reflexivity (isolation, primary and secondary) as 
“thoughts” are experienced unsuitable alternatives to previous experiential features and 
understanding of the world – and a painful distance to the world takes hold.  
2.3.3 Diminished self presence: experiential distance 
Another key feature of High-risk states is the sense of decline in one’s presence in the world 
together with the feeling that experience is no longer unique to the subject (Sass & Parnas 
2003) – shorn of its Meinhaftigkeit or moiété [myness] and could now become of everyone 
else. Again as with hyper-reflexivity, the loss of self-presence is conceptualized as both 
primary and secondary. Primary diminished Self Presence (diminished self-affection) refers 
to the loss of being present as living and being a unified subject of awareness or agent of 
action. It is an expression of the distortions of first-person perspective resulting from the loss 
of ipseity, which would be discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter. At first it can 
be seen in close relation with the previous experiences (1) the subject can no longer take for 
granted his selfhood and (2) many tacit experiences become salient and explicit. Yet such 
reduction involves more than the loss of ownership and agency to entail also the failure to 
distinguish oneself from others ((Herrera et al. 2006; Lallart et al. 2009; Riva et al. 2014; 
Zahorik & Jenison 1998)). Neurobiological evidences for disturbance of body ownership 
point to disturbance of bottom-up multisensory integration and areas such as right temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ) and posterior parietal cortex ((Ehrsson et al. 2005; Tsakiris et al. 
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2008)). These areas together with the somatosensory cortex and the insula are responsible 
for the neuronal representations of a bodily self (see more in (Borda & Sass 2015)). 
Else another form – here devised secondary – of diminished self-presence refers to the 
intentional or defensive process of withdrawing from the world and reducing the sense of 
existing or of being an agent of action. Many of the previous experiences involve variable 
degrees (usually high) stress levels that together with the persistence of a sense of not being 
able to cope with reality result in an appalling experience. It would not be surprising if the 
HR subject attempts to remove himself from such reality and to increasingly aim for self-
objectification (increase clarity on his reality). Indeed such could also explain some of the 
depersonalization phenomena occurring in post-trauma which would motivate such 
secondary form of removal. These processes appear to involve the same brain correlates – 
hyperactivation of the Default-Mode Network (DMN) and the hypoactivation of Central 
Executive Network (CEN) of the salience network (Moran et al. 2013) (Nekovarova et al. 
2014) (Nygård et al. 2012) (Sass & Borda 2015). 
2.3.4 Eccentric/ stance and existence as “singular” 
Another subjective phenomenon occurring in High-Risk states is the fact that narratives of 
life laws and events involve a sort of peculiarity – accounts of reality are singular/exceptional 
and their option for eccentric stances on the world (antagonomia) (see more in (Stanghellini 
& Ballerini 2007) and (Parnas, Møller, et al. 2005)). These include phenomenological 
diverse experiences that range from transformations personal narrative or solipsistic beliefs 
on the world to concrete/tangible changes in the way that the world is perceived. The former 
refers to the disturbance of autobiographical continuity and a feeling of singularity in one’s 
existence in the world – composite forms resulting from the subject “being struck” new 
meanings in his everyday life. The first refers to not having a coherent narrative as if the 
“rules of one’s life” and “nature of one’s events” were frequently anew and in need of 
reintegration. The idea of singularity of reality is related to the previously depicted 
disturbance of salience or in Sass words – “everything is strange, or everything is somehow 
different” designated by “uncanny particularity” (Sass 1992). Everyday routines and 
perceptions that were fortuitous and to which the subject was oblivious and detached become 
striking. In High-risk states it differs from such everyday experiences becoming salient to 
subject which endures a striking uniqueness of events – as if something extraordinarily 
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private (evading understanding) was now entailed in the objects in the perceptual field – “I 
had to stop by that tree. True, it had always stood in front of his house but an utter amazement 
of its uniqueness made me stand by to appreciate why was the tree here?” Every experience 
is fresh and reality elements present themselves as if they were new. 
It should not be understated that all these occurrences are under the umbrella of the 
disturbance of ipseity. These abnormalities unremittingly grind the patient’s links with 
reality. Together they provide the patient with numerous stimuli to process simultaneously, 
promoting his attention to inward stimuli and undermining the “common sense”. If these 
phenomena progress, the patient further experience states of solitude hindering his 
responsiveness to real requests from the external world. Such further disrupts the already 
disturbed core sense of personhood, segregating the patient from reality and making him 
lose contact with that same reality. When this happen, those non-yet psychotic abnormalities 
of the experience of the self, previously characterized by an “as if” characteristic, evolve 
into fully blown psychotic symptoms. 
2.4 Special Sets of Phenomena 
The following phenomena are selective sets that group the previous phenomena into 
meaningful clusters of symptoms. Their standard in HR research appealed to us the needing 
the special detail below.  
2.4.1 Truman Symptoms 
One of the special forms of derealization and perplexity recognized in High-risk states 
(Madeira, Bonoldi, Rocchetti, Brandizzi, et al. 2016) was symbolized into the construct – 
“Truman symptoms” (TS) (Fusar-Poli, Howes, et al. 2008). The idea refers to 1998 Peter 
Weir’s movie, in which the protagonist (Truman) is first unaware of being in a television 
show and gradually becomes suspicious of his world being constructed reality (Fusar-Poli, 
Howes, et al. 2008). TS represent a profound change of the subjective experience and of 
self-awareness, resulting in an unstable first-person perspective with varieties of 
derealization, disturbed sense of ownership, fluidity of the basic sense of identity, distortions 
of the stream of consciousness and experiences of disembodiment  (Fusar-Poli, Howes, et 
al. 2008). They involve rumination on altered subjective phenomena and an increasing self-
 46 
awareness Keeping the “as if” component (not a delusion), he might reach a “Truman 
explanation” that explains what, how and why he experiences that.  
TS are particularly relevant to the psychopathology of UHR group as a form attenuated 
psychotic symptom (Fusar-Poli, Howes, et al. 2008) and because they apprise the cultural 
expression of a psychopathological phenomena in a group familiar with the information 
technologies (such as the internet and virtual reality). 
2.4.2 Anomalous subjective Self-Experiences 
The disturbances of the self (Sass 1992) (Kircher & David 2003) (Parnas et al. 1998) (Sass 
& Parnas 2003) (Zahavi 1999) contain the many of the previous portraitures on subjective 
symptoms and are today central topics of psychopathological research in High-Risk subjects  
(Brent et al. 2014) (Nelson et al. 2008) (Nelson et al. 2012; Nelson, A. Thompson & Yung 
2013) (Stanghellini et al. 2013). For disturbances of the “basic” / “core” / “minimal” self are 
considered the primary disturbance – mainly representing a disruption of ipseity. Such loss 
of ipseity would then forefront the distortions of first-person perspective (diminished self-
presence and self-affection, the changes in process of thought and perception (disturbed grip 
on the cognitive-perceptual world) including the loss of “natural evidence” and increased 
reflexivity and also derealization and depersonalization experiences (see above). 
Disturbances of basic-self have strong neurobiological translational research (Borda & Sass 
2015) (Sass & Borda 2015) accounts of delusion formation in prodromal and early phases 
of psychosis that point to a neurobiological underlying alteration in salience processing of 
stimulus  
(Mishara & Fusar-Poli 2013; Roiser et al. 2013; Winton-Brown et al. 2014). The range of 
the experiences resulting from the disturbance of ipseity have been operationalized in the 
EASE interview – Examination of Anomalous Self-Experiences. This interview selects 
phenomena which involve “subjectively experiencing” a (1) disturbed way of thinking, (2) 
being in the world, (3) one’s own body, (3) interpersonal relations and (5) principles and 
attitudes on the world one lives in. Also it has shown a good internal and external validity 
and its use in subjects in high-risk of psychosis (Nelson et al. 2012; Nelson, A. Thompson, 
Chanen, et al. 2013; Nelson et al. 2009; Nelson, A. Thompson & Yung 2013) and in 
prodromal phases of schizophrenia (Parnas 2005; Nelson et al. 2012) has suggested they 
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could be used as an early marker. It should not be understated that a crucial feature of this 
model is the fact that it is should be assumed as an “overall,” “holistic,” or “gestalt-like” 
disturbance and not as indexed to a single (quantitative) measure ((Parnas, Moller, et al. 
2005) (Parnas et al. 2014)).  
2.4.3 Abnormal Bodily Phenomena 
A similar research track has now explored the prevalence and relevance of ABP in patients 
with first psychotic episode and, in particular, in subjects with diagnosis of schizophrenia 
(Stanghellini et al. 2012; Stanghellini, Ballerini, Blasi, et al. 2014)2. 
Abnormal bodily phenomena (ABP) have been considered in patients with psychosis and 
particularly schizophrenia even in their seminal representations (Jaspers 1963). The notion 
of ABP is related with the ideas of disturbed coenesthesia (Röhricht & Priebe 2002), 
assortments of uncanny bodily feelings with or without delusional interpretation, kinesthetic 
hallucinations (Ey 1973; Uhlhaas & Mishara 2007) and disruptions of body structure and 
boundaries (see more in (Stanghellini, Ballerini & Cutting 2014)). As a group, ABP are 
subjective phenomena that were taken as quasi-ineffable in nature and lacking sensible, 
specific and reliable tools to assess them and therefore, until recently, absent from our 
diagnostic textbooks.  
The “Abnormal Bodily Phenomena Questionnaire” (ABPq) (Stanghellini, Ballerini & 
Cutting 2014; Stanghellini et al. 2012) allows a systematized enquiry of these experiences. 
Studies using ABPq have shown an assortment of bodily phenomena occurring in 
schizophrenia (Stanghellini, Ballerini, Blasi, et al. 2014) and the in the first episode 
psychosis(Stanghellini et al. 2012). These include uncanny feelings of numbness, loss of 
body vitality, the sense of disappearance of parts, change in form (as shrinking or 
enlargement), dimension (as unusual heaviness or lightness) or even “movement of internal 
parts” of the body (Stanghellini, Ballerini, Blasi, et al. 2014; Ey 1973; Dupré 1925). 
Examples of these phenomena are presented in the ascribed textbox.  
Various studies suggest that ABP occur as trait features before the first psychotic episode in 
patients with schizophrenia (Hemsley 1998; Klosterkötter et al. 2001; Röhricht & Priebe 
2002; Stanghellini 2009b; Gallese & Ferri 2013; Schultze-Lutter, Ruhrmann, et al. 2007). 
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The Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental State scale (reference CAARMS) 
already selects disturbances of bodily phenomena as relevant to the HR profile. A recent 
study (Madeira, Bonoldi, Rocchetti, Samson, et al. 2016) explored the prevalence and 
implications of Abnormal Bodily Phenomena in subjects considered at high risk of psychosis 
and found they were highly prevalent (while absent from matched HC) raising the possibility 
that ABP could be a phenotypic component of HR psychopathology. Some of the assorted 
ABP experiences reported by the HR subjects included: the experience of violation “when 
he stretched his hand I felt an energy entering my body. That energy was pounding my right 
side until it break in”; experience of externalization “I felt that my body had become as a 
boiling soup and I was no longer in control of my energy that flows around me. Then my 
body became an ingredient in the soup parts of me are the vapors and rest of the soup”; 
morbid objectivization “I felt my brain freezing. Then thoughts were moving so slowly I 
could feel them drive from ear to ear” and devitalization “The loss of the animal part in me, 
I lost it! I feel that I act as I was programmed, even eating and I feel like a robot, even my 
arms feel artificially attached to me” (among others, see (Madeira, Bonoldi, Rocchetti, 
Samson, et al. 2016)). 
2.5 Why are HR relevant to contemporary research in Psychopathology? 
The relevance of this contemporary field of research comprises ontological (considering the 
possibility of prevention and early intervention in psychiatry) and epistemological (merging 
of assorted neurobiological, philosophical and epidemiological contributions) novelties. To 
handle and keep expanding such breadth of knowledge, researchers and clinicians should 
bear enough conceptual and phenomenological knowledge on the experiences that occur in 
High-Risk sates. Such knowledge is vital in contemporary predictive and translational 
research which will ultimately guide the integration of phenomenological data with the 
neurocognitive and neurobiological models (do you like this as it is Ilaria?).  This chapter 
reviewed the assortment of phenomena portrayed by subjects in HR states of Psychosis and 
focusing in subjective symptoms. In this sense, HR states not only bear the anticipation of a 
new scenario in the identification and treatment of psychiatry disorders but also they have 
been, and must continue on being, an archetype of a phenomenologically-informed 
psychopathology. 
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4. The state of the art of dissociation
The nature of the distress of depersonalization experiences displays the complexity of human 
subjective experience suggesting the possibility of suffering not only through the presence 
of a feeling but also by the lack of feelings. Derealization implies that the meaning of 
experiences is not immediate but a process inner attribution of meaning (and 
conceptualization) in which if disturbed can lead to different amounts of perplexity (or even 
loss of natural evidence). Most of the descriptions are made by metaphors adding to the 
overall idea that these changes in engagement with the world, enactment of meanings and 
periods of loss of awareness are not easily transmittable. As a group, DP are complex as they 
involve (1) a large range of phenomena and (2) they occur in a large number of psychiatric 
and neurologic disorders as well as in healthy persons. The idea of dissociation in psychiatry 
has had various inputs and such is expressed in symptomatology (conceptual halo) and 
nosology, as in the different stances about dissociative disorders expressed in DSM-5 and 
ICD-10 (Association 2013) (World Health Organization 1992). As with other psychiatric 
symptoms, DP are in need of increased conceptual and phenomenological examination. 
Dissociative disorders as a broad category raise criticism on the "lack (of) a single, coherent 
referent ... that all investigators in the field embrace" (chapter by Cardena in (Lynn & Rhue 
1994)) and yet some of its central categories have shown phenomenological consistency (as 
is the case of depersonalization (Sierra & Berrios 2001)). Dissociative amnesia, 
depersonalization (and de-realization), conversion symptoms (somatic symptoms), pseudo-
hallucinations, trance and self-disturbances are taken as classic dissociative phenomena. 
The up-to-date manuals including the ICD-10 (Association 2013) (World Health 
Organization 1992) and the DSM-5 (Association 2013) use mainly an epistemology of 
changes of consciousness and the separation of “mental functions” (Hilgard 1973). The ICD-
10 takes dissociative phenomena as a partial or total loss of (1) an integrated memory system, 
(2) a conscious awareness of identity or sensations and (3) the control of bodily movements
and DSM-5 details it as a “separation of mental functions usually integrated and consciously 
accessible” comprising either/both memory, identity, perception, emotions and will (Hilgard 
1973). The DSM-IV was reorganized in the DSM-5 to increase the homogeneity of the 
categories – depersonalization/derealization disorder instead of depersonalization and 
accepting dissociative amnesia as encompassing dissociative fugue. Overall the clinical use 
of both classifications involves intense criticism as patients are frequently assigned with the 
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diagnosis of “dissociative disorder not otherwise specified” ((Saxe et al. 1993) and 
Kihlstrom in (Lynn & Rhue 1994)). 
An historical review of the conceptual models for dissociation is out of the scope of this 
chapter and can be found in a comprehensive review by Onno van der Hart and Martin 
Dorahy (Dell & O'Neil 2010). From their analysis some important ideas are retrieved. First 
the conceptualization of dissociation is riven from the very start as (1) a detachment of parts 
of personality in Puysegur, Moreau de Tthes, Gros Jean and Taine or (2) the occurrence of 
double consciousness described in Charcot, Feinkeind, Janet and Binet (see more in (Dell & 
O'Neil 2010)). The former suggests a disorganisation of the incorporation of personality 
elements. The latter proposes a behavitheal override by an independent mental structure that 
the subject is unaware and that burst directly as a response to a stimulus.  
An important epistemological quarrel included dissociation being considered a 
phenomenon, a neurological explanation or a psychological understanding. As an 
explanation dissociation is seen as the mechanism of the conversion symptoms in Psychiatry 
and of functional symptoms in Neurology. The latter has provided dissociation another 
delicate aura – functional symptoms stand for absence of an organic explanation that 
neurologists would claim real (dissociation=absence of a real cause). As a psychological 
explanation (e.g. psychoanalytical inputs) dissociation stands as the most relevant 
conceptualization of hysterical symptoms by the separation of psychological elements under 
the light of preceding stressors (traumatic experiences). Further studies have suggested a 
consistent psychological and biological correlation between trauma and dissociative 
phenomena (see seminal work by Ferenczi (Putnam 1989). As a phenomenon, dissociation 
is also represented in the ideas of depersonalization, fugue state and dissociative amnesia. 
Dissociative phenomena as a group are troubling as each phenomenon occurs in contrasting 
situations (e.g. depersonalization in Anxiety Disorders and dissociative amnesia arising in 
patients that do not express clear anxiety symptoms and can sometimes show “la belle 
indifference”). Linking the previous considerations lead to even more intricate possibilities 
as depersonalization being considered a dissociative phenomenon with an anxious 
explanation (Baker et al. 2003; Sierra et al. 2012) or as a mechanism (detachment) of 
dissociative phenomena (Holmes et al. 2005).  
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Dissociative phenomena must also be distinguished if they occur (1) as a lifelong trait as in 
patients with schizoid, borderline and anxious personality disorders or (2) in particular states 
as in depressive episodes, panic attacks or epilepsy (C. Krüger & Mace 2010). Trait 
dissociation also appears to be phenomenologically related to the idea of schizophrenic 
autism and other basic symptoms. This discussion renders some troubles in the 
conceptualization of other dissociative phenomena as for instance amnesia in its anterograde 
form (inability to encode while in the situation) appears as a state while retrograde amnesia 
(inability to retrieve elements of past situations) might occur as trait.  
Another input is that dissociative phenomena could also accept lighter deviations of 
consciousness (e.g. daydreaming) suggesting that it is dimensional with non-pathological 
states (e.g. meditation). This discussion is age-old and materialized in the seminal 
quarrelling by (1) Pierre Janet who supported that true dissociation only occurred in mental 
patients, specifically in hysteric subjects (Janet 2015) and (2) William James (James 1950) 
and Morton Prince (Prince 2015) who suggested it was dimensional occurring in adaptive 
and useful experiences (e.g. during stressful events) or in pathological situations. Some 
empirical studies support that a class of dissociation is pathological (Waller et al. 1996)  and 
yet still with no nosological bearing as it occurs indistinctively in diverse taxonomical 
categories such as dissociation, schizophrenia or PTSD (Waller & Ross 1997). 
4.1 Specific dissociative experiences 
As discussed, by rule, dissociative experiences are the psychogenic counterparts of 
somatic and neurological symptoms and can possibly feign any physical or mental symptom 
– therefore all forms of human experiences (normal or disordered) can be considered
dissociative. These would include flashbacks, identity confusion, psychotic-like symptoms, 
visual hallucinations (Steinberg et al. 1990) or even Schneider first rank symptoms (Ilhan 
Yargiç et al. 1998). Yet it is possible to separate experiences that are considered classic 
forms of dissociation (having a dissociative mechanism). This section reviews dissociative 
amnesia, depersonalization (and derealization), conversion symptoms (somatic symptoms), 
pseudohallucinations, trance and self-disturbances. They are not specific of dissociative 
disorders as they are present in several axis I (e.g. self disturbances in schizophrenia) and 
axis II categories (e.g. self disturbances in emotionally unstable personality disorder) 
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Amnesia 
Dissociative amnesia has been clinically relevant since (ABELES 1935)  and is the most 
common dissociative experience. It consists in trouble to retrieve or recall memory data 
including entire chapters of life from hthes to years (Leong et al. 2006). Traumatic events 
are often contemplated as the causative element and conventionally there is no brain lesion 
explaining such loss. It is discussed whether dissociative amnesia is a form of neurological 
memory disorder (Lucchelli & Spinnler 2002) as its neurological etiology (entertaining, for 
instance, a Transient Ischemic Attack) and relations with other disorders have been 
extensively reviewed (Serra et al. 2007). Recent research has changed the position of 
dissociative fugue so that it has become a specifier of dissociative amnesia (Association 
2013). Fugue states involve behavior (many times unplanned travel or wandering) that is 
sometimes described by the subject or others as corresponding to a new personal identity 
and to which the subject will have no memory of. It is usually precipitated by a stressful 
episode (see details in DSM-5 2013).  
Dissociative fugue, now under the topic of dissociative amnesia in the DSM-5, includes 
states, which there is wandering involved with behavior different from habitual self. There 
have been many theories regarding the etio-genicity of fugue states including organic 
disorders as cranial trauma (Berrington, 1956) and epilepsy (Broglin 1992). 
Depersonalization 
Despite of the statement of a relative stability on the core concept of depersonalization 
(Sierra & Berrios 2001), its phenomenology and epistemology has suffered interesting but 
not always compatible progresses. Differences in seminal descriptions already show-striking 
differences, as in Griesinger and in it’s coining by Dugas in 1898 (see more (Sierra & Berrios 
1997)). Griesinger’s account suggests that it is “as if each of my senses, each one part of 
oneself was separated from me and couldn’t offer me any feeling, my eyes see and my spirit 
has perception but the sensation of what I see is absent” (Griesinger 1867). He had proposed 
a change in self-affection and a reduction of patients’ experience (also in portrayals by 
Esquirol and Billod). Dugas’ else envisioned a loss of understanding and perplexity: 
“alienation of personality, a state where thoughts and acts become strange to the self”. These 
conceptions anticipated many other elaborations: (1) a change in the sensorial modalities as 
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portrayed by, (2) disturbances in the potency of perception (Störring 1987); (3) a change in 
memory (Kraepelin & Lange 1927); (4) a change in Self-Experience (Janet in (Putnam 
1989); (5) and a change in emotions, whether of, (6) a diminished feeling of activity or (7) 
of diminishing existential feelings (see more detail in (Sierra & Berrios 1997). Jaspers added 
that depersonalization could also be the awareness of alien and automatic perception, 
memories, ideas, thoughts and feelings (Jaspers 1963). 
Somatic Symptoms 
Many mental disorders are considered as having dissociative bodily symptoms (e.g. 
cenesthethic or pain experiences), frequently named conversion symptoms (in Psychiatry) 
or functional symptoms (in Neurology). Some hospitals have generated special units – 
Neuropsychiatric wards – that deal with these situations that frequently are non-responsive 
to psychopharmacological treatment. 
Pseudo-hallucinations and true Hallucinations 
Dissociative experiences occur sometimes as perceptual abnormalities that are often 
declared as pseudo-hallucinations for their odd phenomenology (e.g. hallucinations within 
one’s head) and inconsistent clustering with other symptoms that are commonly together. 
Nevertheless, true auditory hallucinations were described in Dissociative Identity Disorder 
(DID) both in form of commenting and command voices (Dell & O'Neil 2010). Visual 
hallucinations occur though frequently need to be phenomenologically detailed for the 
differential diagnosis from flashbacks. Such peculiar perceptual changes are akin to the 
experiences described in the EASE for their psychotic-like status but yet remaining below 
the threshold of true psychotic experiences. 
Trance 
The experience of trance is considered beyond the limits of mental disorder (anthropological 
studies) and any psychiatric frame for such experiences need a cultural analysis. Trance 
states are different from fugue states as the subject experiences a change in his personal 
identity but remains fully aware of the surroundings(Dell & O'Neil 2010). Also most trance 
experiences are empowering or voluntary/semi-voluntary. The voluntary nature of trance is 
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akin to introspection and its relation discussed earlier in this chapter with basic-self 
experiences.  
Self-disturbances 
Though many times ignored the change in the sense of Self is the sixth most frequent 
dissociative symptom in DID and the psychophysiological processes that derive in 
dissociative experiences include a disturbance in the sense of self. These are the core 
experiences explored in the remaining chapters and therefore explained in much detail 
before. 
5. Narratives and the limits in the accessibility to meanings 
One of the topics in this thesis is that there is need of careful phenomenological exploration 
of patients narratives. It focuses in detailing the differences between “psychotic-like 
experiences” with no psychopathological bearing and those phenomena that could be risk 
factors / markers of a psychiatric disorder. Indeed, basic-self disturbances are expressed 
through the patients’ narratives and reliant on that these narratives being good 
representatives of basic self phenomena. For there are two scopes which are significant to 
this essay: (1) a portion of patients identity seem linked to their ability to form and report 
narrative accounts of their life (McLean et al. 2007) and (2) psychiatric methods for 
diagnosis and research are dependent on narratives as means of systematizing experiences.  
The first topic includes the way one finds a coherent self-narrative for his life and how that 
is a part of one’s self-concept beyond all experiential and physical domain – “the corporeal 
envelope of the friend had been so well stuffed with all this (narrative details), as well as with 
a few memories relating to his parents, that this particular Swann had become a complete 
and living being, and I have the impression of leaving one person to go to another distinct 
from him, when in my memory, I pass from the Swann I knew later with accuracy to that first 
Swann whom I rediscover the charming mistakes of my youth and who in fact resembles less 
the other Swann than he resembles the other people I knew at the time, as though it were the 
same in life as in a museum where all the portraits from one period have a family look about 
them, one tonality” (Proust 2003). The author alludes to the idea narratives (both 
autobiographical and of others) are part of the identity one has both for himself and for 
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others. This has been a field of study for psychotherapy and treatment goals (Singer in (Beike 
et al. 2004)) and for describing disturbances in schizophrenia (P. H. Lysaker et al. 2005). 
Disturbances at this level entail the (a) incongruence between one’s autobiographical 
narrative and one’s experience (experiencing an existential orientation to an extent that it no 
longer adapts to previous narrative) and (b) periods of life to which one has experienced but 
cannot find a narrative for and (c) the occurrence of incidents that don’t fit in one’s standard 
narrative. Dissociative identity disorder and borderline personality disorder are said to be 
examples of pathology of the narrative level of self-experience (S. Gallagher 2011) but also, 
and here speculative, allowing the person to narrate subjective experiences (by adding them 
to the psychopathological examination) might increase the congruence between the basic-
narrative self and have a therapeutic value. 
The second idea, and most important to what is here discussed, is that narratives comprise 
the accessibility of patients meaning as contingent on (i) his capacity to find words for his 
experiences (ii) his ability to structure a narrative and (iii) the psychiatrist’s aptitude to 
access the meaning he is portraying. The process of attributing meaning to one’s experience 
is private and persons have both (1) partial arrays of symbols so both the description of being 
“anxious” might correspond to two different experiences and the description of 
“nervousness” and “anxiety” can correspond to the same experiential features (2) symbols 
which are not universally recognized as they are depend on cultural and diachronic changes 
– e.g. identical experiences might be designated differently, as in melancholia of the 19th
century Psychiatry, the sadness experienced in a farmer, or depressed mood said by a 
psychologist (see more in (Figueira 2015)). Indeed there have been discussions of the idea 
of “meaning-complexes” which are dependent on patients’ cultural and social ground 
(Geertz 1973) (Monti & Stanghellini 1996). 
An analysis on patients’ pathological narratives show their contingency to content and 
structure of what is narrated. Those can be (1) narratives of psychopathological experiences, 
(2) situational artifacts (e.g. being shut because of anxiety or shyness) which can also have
psychopathological significance and (3) in themselves standing for structural disturbances. 
The first part is dependent on the problems mentioned in the previous subsection. The second 
claim regards changes related to setting and situations which entail the problem of external 
coherence that is dependent (1) on the quality of intersubjective setting, (2) shared cultural 
ground and (3) the landscape of psychiatric assessment (see next section). 
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The complexity of the last prospect can be presented in the particular case of disordered 
narratives in SSD where there are at least three prototypes: a disturbance of agency lead to 
the inability to of building self-referential narratives (Gallagher in (Kircher & David 2003; 
Graham 2014) fragmented narratives in schizophrenia arise due to a change in temporality 
and ipseity (Sass & Parnas 2003) and narratives in SSD are the loss of an internal self 
dialogue which becomes monological (P. H. Lysaker & J. T. Lysaker 2008). Also there 
seems to exist specificities within each narrative that show deceptive narratives have 
different structure from true ones (ELISA KRACKOW 2010).  
The idea of self-narrative as being important to the understanding of dissociative experiences 
has also been acclaimed (S. Gallagher & Cole 2011). There are phenomenological 
specificities to the narratives of dissociative experiences: they are narratives of events that 
are (1) not experienced but been externally portrayed; (2) experienced as belonging to one’s 
life though the person cannot recall them through a narrative (3) self-consciously detached 
from usual way of experiencing (4) they are sometimes salient and have a pitch of 
strangeness while other times show an intrinsic distance between the narrator and the 
narrated event. The first and second subtypes include episodes of dissociative fugue and 
amnesia while the third and forth relate to depersonalization and derealization phenomena.  
  
BASIC-SELF DISORDERS BEYOND SCHIZOPHRENIA: IN ULTRA-HIGH-RISK AND PANIC DISORDER 
57 
Chapter 2: Prevalence and implications of Truman symptoms in 
subjects at Ultra High Risk for psychosis 
1. Summary
Preliminary qualitative research has suggested that patients in early stages of psychosis and 
those at Ultra High Risk (UHR) may experience “Truman symptoms” (TS). This arm of the 
thesis investigated TS in a sample of 26 UHR subjects and 14 matched controls (HC) 
recruited from three prodromal and early intervention clinics and its relation with clinical 
features, depersonalization and basic self-disturbances. The UHR were assessed with the 
Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental States (CAARMS), Social and Occupational 
Functioning Assessment Scale (SOFAS), the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
(PANSS), the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS) and the Examination of 
Anomalous Self Experiences (EASE) checklist. In this sample, TS were specific (TS absent 
in HC) and highly prevalent (50%) in UHR subjects. EASE total scores differed across HC, 
UHR with TS and without TS (EASE, H(2)=31.128, p<0.001) but post-hoc analyses showed 
similar scores in the two latter groups (adjusted p>0.05). Despite the sample scores 
suggesting that HR with and without TS might share the same Anomalous Subjective Self-
Experiences other interpretations are discussed. The presence of TS in this UHR sample was 
associated with higher PANSS general psychopathology score (t(24)= -2.260, p=0.033) but 
with no significant difference in the CAARMS, CDS and SOFAS scores. This arm suggested 
TS that they might be prevalent and specific of UHR subjects. 
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2. Introduction 
Early psychiatric literature portrays the features of impending psychosis as arrangements of 
depersonalization and derealization (Binswanger 1957; Conrad 1958; Matussek 1952) and 
operationalized both early by Kurt Schneider in 1st rank symptoms (Schneider 1959) and 
later by Frank James Fish (Fish, Casey and Kelly 2006). These have been described as 
changes in the perception of reality, in the understanding of subject’s own experiences and 
in detachment from experience (see a detailed account in (Mishara 2010)) and can be 
measured on specific psychometric scales such as the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale 
(CDS) (Sierra & Berrios 2000). These phenomena have been recently symbolized into a new 
clinical construct denominated “Truman symptoms” (TS) (Fusar-Poli, Howes, et al. 2008) 
stressing the sense that the ordinary is changed or different and leading towards a “Truman 
explanation”. It refers to the famous 1998 Peter Weir’s movie, in which Truman, the 
protagonist, has lived his life unaware of being in a constructed reality television show and 
gradually starts to become suspicious of his world (Fusar-Poli, Howes, et al. 2008). TS might 
be particularly relevant to the psychopathology of UHR group as they: a) are in tune with 
the dimensional model of psychosis and the possibility of attenuated psychotic symptoms 
(Fusar-Poli, Howes, et al. 2008) and b) they might apprise the cultural expression of a 
psychopathological phenomena in this group at young age (familiar with the internet and the 
virtual reality). 
On a psychopathological level, TS are characterized by a profound change of the subjective 
experience and of self-awareness, resulting in an unstable first-person perspective with 
varieties of derealization, disturbed sense of ownership, fluidity of the basic sense of identity, 
distortions of the stream of consciousness and experiences of disembodiment (Fusar-Poli, 
Howes, et al. 2008). A subject with TS focuses on his sense of self as if ruminating on altered 
subjective phenomena to which he was previously oblivious. By increasing his self-
awareness he focuses and constantly monitors the what, how and why he experiences 
subjective phenomena. Then, keeping the “as if” component (not a delusion), he might reach 
a “Truman explanation”. Examples of patient quotes can be found in Box 1. TS are 
conceptually close to the alterations of “basic sense of self” which also include, along others, 
distortion of first-person perspective, changes in process of thought, the loss of “natural 
evidence”, increased reflexivity and derealization and depersonalization experiences. All the 
latter have been comprehensively addressed in recent years with detailed descriptions of 
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each of phenomena (Sass & Parnas 2003; Parnas, Møller, et al. 2005; Zahavi 2000). The 
disturbances of basic-self also seem to support modern accounts of delusion formation in 
prodromal and early phases of psychosis that point to a neurobiological underlying alteration 
in salience processing of stimulus  
(Mishara & Fusar-Poli 2013; Roiser et al. 2013; Winton-Brown et al. 2014). 
Despite the above observations, that suggest a potential key role of TS in subjects at Ultra 
High clinical risk for psychosis (HR), particularly the attenuated psychosis symptoms group, 
their validity as a clinical construct is unknown. First, their occurrence with respect to the 
UHR state as compared to HC has never been investigated. Second, their impact on 
presenting UHR symptoms is undetermined. Here are addressed these issues in UHR 
subjects. The first aim was to measure the prevalence of TS in UHR subjects and matched 
HC. The second aim was to investigate if TS status affected clinical characteristic of HR, 
including (i) disturbance of basic self-experiences (EASE), (ii) derealisation and 
depersonalization phenomena (CDS), (iii) functional status (SOFAS), (iv) UHR symptoms 
(CAARMS, PANSS). The final aim was to test correlation between these latter items 
 “I’m constantly worrying about me. I wouldn’t say I’m persecuted but everything feels 
oppressive. Take this table or these walls – they’re strange. I guess everything looks 
phony! But its not only here, the walls in my living room also feel paper-like as if I was 
in a set.” 
“This started with me thinking rather than feeling. Thinking go the best of me and I 
started to find it hard to sleep. You can’t imagine what is like to know everything is 
simulated. Having dinner – even at my grandma house! – seems faked!” 
”my life feels like a computer game, I know the variables within but I can’t set them, 
surely someone is setting them.” 
“like The Matrix. Oh… so many times I felt that someone was controlling my world and 
it was definitely not god. The feeling that things in my world were strangely man-made.” 
“for the last two years I started this feeling of constant preoccupation. This worrying… 
is like a permanent dull pain and when I look to others I feel that they know what is 
happening to me. So many eyes looking at me, you know – like a Big Brother!” 
Table 1: Patient Quotes on Truman symptoms 
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following a recent research track (Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 2013) suggesting that the 
constructs of derealisation and depersonalization and basic self-disturbances could overlap. 
3. Material and methods 
3.1 Setting and Sample 
Participants with Ultra High Clinical Risk for psychosis were enrolled from OASIS 
(prodromal clinic, SLaM NHS Foundation Trust, London (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013)), West 
London Early Intervention and CAMEO (Cambridge Early Onset”, Cambridge University, 
Cambridge, UK) Teams. These are well-established prodromal and early intervention clinics 
for young adults with early symptoms of psychosis. Subjects included in the study were 
between 18 and 35 years of age. Participants undertook a detailed multidisciplinary 
assessment including combined review of clinical judgment, screening instruments and 
semi-structured clinical interviews (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013). The UHR group was defined by 
High-Risk criteria derived from Comprehensive Assessment of At Risk Mental State 
(CAARMS) (Yung et al. 2005) and the Social and Occupation Functioning Assessment 
Scale (SOFAS) (Goldman et al. 1992). In respect to the use of drugs, 65% had never used 
recreational/illicit drugs, 12.5% had experimented while 15% had moderate to severe use. 
The UHR sample received medication that included antidepressants (22,5%) and 
antipsychotics (7,5%). Because of the limited sample size it was not possible to compare 
these groups. The naturalistic impact of medication on the long term outcomes of the patients 
has been fully addressed in a separate publication by the group (Fusar-Poli et al. 2015). In 
their follow-up so far, which ranged from 24-32 months, two of the sample subjects 
transitioned to a psychotic episode. Healthy controls were recruited locally via advertisement 
and matched for age and gender. They had no present or past personal psychiatric history 
and negative family history for psychiatric disorders. The study received ethical approval 
and all the subjects participated after signing a written voluntary informed consent form. 
3.2 Procedure 
Two psychiatrists (LM and IB) with strong psychopathological training (including expertise 
in the EASE checklist) performed the interviews with the instruments detailed below. LM 
was blind to clinical diagnosis – he was unaware if subjects were HR or controls. LM 
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performed all interviews (20 of which alone). Inter-rater reliability on the EASE measure 
was ensured through proper training and combined scoring of tape-recorded interviews. If 
contrasting scores were recorded at the end of the interviews the final results were obtained 
through consensus discussion. 
3.3 Sociodemographics 
Information was collected from the subjects’ clinical file on age, gender, country of birth, 
employment (full time students were considered employed), education, history of psychiatric 
treatment, family history of psychiatric disorder and duration of symptoms prior to clinic 
entry, in line with previous OASIS studies (Fusar-Poli et al., 2013). Healthy controls were 
subject to the same clinical enquiring in a research setting. The sample was recruited between 
August 2013 and November 2013. 
3.4 Clinical Measures 
Truman symptoms (TS) (Fusar-Poli, Howes, et al. 2008) 
The prevalence of TS in UHR and HC subjects was evaluated clinically as follows. TS were 
considered present if the following three features were described during the clinical 
interview i) a sense that the ordinary is changed or different, ii) the subject describes that 
there is a particular significance leading to ‘Truman explanation’ all of which is 
accompanied by one or more of the following iii) a profound alteration of subjective 
experience and of self-awareness, resulting in an unstable first-person perspective with 
varieties of derealization, disturbed sense of ownership, fluidity of the basic sense of identity, 
distortions of the stream of consciousness and experiences of disembodiment. The clinical 
definition used here is in line with previous account of the TS (Mishara & Fusar-Poli 2013; 
Fusar-Poli, Howes, et al. 2008). The interviewers solicited patients with open questions on 
changes on the experience of their world and then directly inquired on all the three criteria 
above whilst administering the EASE or CAARMS assessment. The third criterion is further 
detailed in the EASE in the self-awareness and presence domain and the reader can refer to 
the seminal paper to find a detailed explanation and patient examples of each of the items 
(see reference below). 
 62 
Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental State (CAARMS) (Yung et al. 2005) 
This is a semi-structured clinical interview designed to assess attenuated psychotic 
symptoms (including perceptual and thought disturbances) and represents the core part of 
the initial assessment of OASIS and CAMEO teams. It consists of 28 items divided through 
7 subscales: 4 Positive Symptom items, 2 Cognitive and 3 Emotional Disturbances items, 3 
Negative Symptoms items, 4 Behavioral Change items, 4 Motor/Physical Changes items, 
and 8 General Psychopathology items. The scores were used as a measure of the UHR 
presenting symptoms. The scores include rating of the severity and frequency of the 
symptom in a 6-point assessment (from 0 absent/never to 6 psychotic and 
severe/continuous). 
Social and Occupation Functioning Assessment Scale (Goldman et al. 1992) 
This scale is a modified version of the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale 
separating the measures of social and occupational functioning from the measures of 
symptoms and psychological functioning. Its scores range from 0 to 100. Scoring is 
according to information obtained in the psychiatric interview. 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay et al. 1987) 
This is a seven-point assessment (from absent to extreme) of 30 items across three domains: 
7 positive, 7 negative and 16 general psychopathology items. It was used in the study to 
assess general psychopathology and positive and negative symptoms. It was part of the 
assessment at admission in the OASIS and CAMEO teams. 
Examination of Anomalous Self Experiences checklist (EASE) (Parnas et al., 2005b) 
This is a checklist for a semi-structured interview of anomalous subjective experience with 
57 items (88 if sub-items are included) and a Cronbach α of 0,87 (Moller et al., 2011). It is 
divided into 5 domains: a) 28 sub-items on cognition and stream of consciousness; b) 36 
sub-items on self-awareness and presence; c) 16 sub-items on bodily experiences; d) 6 sub-
items on demarcation/transitivism; e) 8 sub-items on existential reorientation. The overall 
score was rated dichotomously in accordance with presence (1) or absence (0) of items. It 
has been shown to be a reliable instrument (Moller et al., 2011) measuring anomalous 
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experiences of the “pre-reflective” sense of first-person perspective or basic self. These 
abnormalities of self-awareness have then been shown as promising in the conceptualization 
of those at risk of psychosis (Nelson et al., 2008) and in schizophrenia-prone individuals 
(Nelson et al., 2013; Parnas, 2005). Also, they have been empirically substantiated in a) early 
psychosis (Parnas et al., 2005a), b) prodromal phases of psychosis (Nelson et al., 2012; 
Parnas et al., 1998; Zahavi, 2000) and c) in the silent side of spectrum of schizophrenia 
(Raballo and Parnas, 2011). 
Cambridge Depersonalization Scale, (CDS) (Sierra & Berrios 2000) 
This is a 29 item self-report scale to be used in assessing depersonalization and derealisation 
experiences including frequency and duration (α 0,89). Frequency of phenomena is rated 
from 0 (never) to 4 (all the time), while duration is rated from 1 (few seconds) to 6 (more 
than a week). It was used as an indirect measure and proof of external validity for the 
“Truman symptoms”. The TS was correlated with the overlapping constructs of CDS and 
EASE (as shown below). 
3.5 Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive analysis included t-tests for continuous variables and Fisher exact test for 
categorical variables. Inter-rater reliability was tested by independent reevaluation of the 
tape recording of the first 6 interviews (three interviews performed by IB and three by LM 
which were subsequently evaluated by the other interviewer). 
The first aim was to measure the prevalence of TS in UHR subjects and matched HC. So in 
the first analysis was a comparison of the prevalence of TS in UHR subjects and HC. The 
second aim was to investigate if TS status affected clinical characteristic of HR, including: 
a) disturbance of basic self-experiences (EASE); b) derealisation and depersonalization
phenomena (CDS); c) functional status (SOFAS); d) UHR symptoms (CAARMS, PANSS). 
Regarding the first three measures, since the assumption of normality and homogeneity of 
variance were violated (Shapiro-Wilk test significant in at least one group for each variable, 
p<0.05; Levene test significant in every variable but EASE Existential Reorientation 
subscale, p<0.05), here was decided to perform Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test. It was 
performed post-hoc pairwise analysis accounting for multiple comparisons. CAARMS and 
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PANSS scores were compared using t-tests as normality assumption was retained. When not 
otherwise specified, two-side p<0.05 was considered significant and Bonferroni’s correction 
for multiple comparisons was applied. The last aim was to test correlation between CDS and 
EASE total score in the UHR group. Again, since the normality assumption was not retained, 
bootstrap (10000 iterations) was performed to compute 95% CI, after visual inspection of 
scatter plots to exclude potential outliers. All the analyses were performed under SPSS IBM 
22. 
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4. Results
4.1 Sociodemographic characteristics 
The interviews in HC took on average 58 (SD 10) and 134 min (SD 40) in UHR subjects. 
The overall inter-rater correlation of EASE total score was 0.90 (p<0.001). The sample 
consisted of 26 UHR subjects with mean age of 23.73 (SD 4.35) years and of which 57% 
males. The matching sample of HC participants did not differ in baseline demographics, 
accounted in Table 1, but healthy controls had a higher employment rate than UHR 
(p=0.037). 









or n (%) 










or n (%) 
Age at 
inclusion 









38 (95) 13 (92.9) 12 (92.3)  13 (100) 




Male 19 (47.5) 4 (28.6) 7 (53.8)  8 (61.5) 




White British 24 (60) 10 (71.4) 6 (46.2)  8 (61.5) 
Other 15 (37.5) 4 (28.6) 7 (53.8)  4 (30.8) 






Yes 27 (67.5) 13 (92.9) 8 (61.5 )  6 (46.2) 
No 12 (30) 1 (7.1) 5 (38.5 )  6 (46.2) 





14.79±2.90 16.14±3.44 14.38±2.18 13.67±2.46 2.783 
p=0.07
5 
number of subjects or Mean ± SD. Percentages under parenthesis. 
* p-values refer to ANOVA and Fisher’s Exact Test between HC, UHR-TS- and UHR-TS+ group for
continuous and categorical values respectively
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4.2 Prevalence of TS in HR 
TS were absent from all subjects in HC group and present in 50% of the subjects in UHR 
group. Hereinafter, the acronym UHR-TS+ represents subjects that referred TS, while UHR-
TS- represents those that did not. 
4.3 CDS, EASE, SOFAS, CAARMS and PANSS scores across groups 
There were statistically significant differences in EASE and CDS scores (H(2)=31.1, 
p<0.001 and H(2)=20.4, p<0.001 respectively) across the three groups of HC, UHR-TS+ 
and UHR-TS-. According with post-hoc tests (adjusted for multiple comparisons), HC 
scored lower than UHR-TS- and UHR-TS+ in CDS and EASE, including subscales, with 
the exception of Existential Reorientation (H(1)=-5.6, p=0.591) and 
Demarcation/transitivism subscale (H(1)=-5.7, p=0.396) in which there were no significant 
difference between HC and UHR-TS-. There was no significant difference between UHR-
TS- and UHR-TS+ in EASE (H(1)=-10.3, p=0.074), CDS (H(1)=-5.7, p=0.453) and EASE 
subscales with two exceptions: UHR-TS- showed lower scores than UHR-TS+ on 
Existential Reorientation (H(1)=-12.5, p=0.014) and Demarcation/transitivism subscales 
(H(1)=-10.2, p=0.025). The three groups also differed for SOFAS scores on functioning with 
overall impairment in the two UHR groups as compared with HC (H(2) 22.875, p<0.001) 
but no difference emerged between UHR-TS- and UHR-TS+ (H(1)=-3.5, p=1.000, adjusted 
for multiple comparisons). Regarding psychotic and general psychopathology, UHR 
subjects with and without TS were compared using t-test since the sample distribution 
approximate normality for the scales adopted. No significant difference emerged in the 
CAARMS (UHR-TS-=33.85±16.42, UHR-TS+=43.54±21.64, t=-1.286 (24), p=0.211) and 
PANSS total scores (UHR-TS-=48.31±11.72, UHR-TS+=57.31±16.90, t=-1.578 (24), 
p=0.128). However the UHR-TS- group scored lower on PANSS general psychopathology 
subscale when compared with UHR-TS+ group (t(24)= -2.260, p=0.033, Hedges’g= 1.39 
indicating large effect size). Table 3 portrays CDS, EASE and SOFAS scores across the 
three groups while Table 4 details the differences in the CAARMS and PANSS subscales 
between UHR-TS- and UHR-TS+. The sample distribution of EASE and CDS total scores 
in three groups is additionally illustrated in figure 1 and 2. 
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Median (with range) and mean rank for each group are reported. Three groups were compared and considering 
the non-normal distribution of data and heterogeneity of variance – the Kruskal–Wallis non-parametric test 
was adopted.  







t (24) p value 
PANSS Positive symptoms 11.31±3.09 14.23±4.36 -1.971 p=0.060 
PANSS Negative symptoms 12.62±4.71 11.69±5.04 0.482 p=0.634 
PANSS General Psychopathology 24.31±6.40 31.38±9.31 -2.260
p=0.033
* 
CAARMS Positive symptoms 7.15±4.24 9.00±3.42 -1.223 p=0.233 
CAARMS Cognitive Disturbances 3.0±2.31 2.31±1.70 0.870 p=0.393 
CAARMS Emotional Disturbances 3.00±3.06 3.00±3.06 0.000 p=1.000 
CAARMS Negative symptoms 4.85±3.05 5.38±3.93 -0.390 p=0.700 
CAARMS Behavioral Changes 4.69±4.05 6.85±4.51 -1.282 p=0.212 
CAARMS Motor/Physical 
Changes 
1.23±2.20 2.31±4.15 -0.826 p=0.417 
CAARMS General 
Psychopathology 
10.00±6.31 14.62±7.05 -1.758 p=0.091 
We present the comparison between UHR-TS- with UHR-TS+. * Significant difference (2-sided p<0.05) 
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Figure 1: Examination of Anomalous Self Experiences Scores HC, UHR-TS- and UHR-
TS+ groups. 
The three groups differed for total EASE score (N=40, H(2)=31.128, p<0.001) 
 
 
Figure 2: Cambridge Depersonalization Scale scores across HC, UHR-TS- and UHR-
TS+ groups 
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Figure 3: Correlation between EASE and CDS score in the HC and UHR sample 
(r=0.902, 95% CI 0.834-0.960, p<0.001 bootstrap method applied) 
4.4. Correlation between CDS and EASE in HC and HR 
We further tested the relationship between EASE and CDS scores within the sample and 
found a significant correlation between scores (r=0.902, 95% CI 0.834 - 0.960, p<0.001 



















To my best knowledge this was the first time the prevalence of TS in UHR subjects was 
investigated. In this seminal exploration, TS appear to be specific and highly prevalent in 
the UHR sample, as 50% of the UHR subjects experienced TS. Furthermore, in the sample, 
TS were exclusive to the UHR group empirically suggesting that they might be a phenotypic 
marker of this state. If the relatively high prevalence of TS found in the UHR subjects was 
replicated in other UHR samples, the idea that TS might be related to vulnerability to 
psychosis could be supported. However, as half of the UHR subjects did not present TS they 
might characterize experiences of a specific subgroup. This would go along with the fact 
that the UHR group is heterogeneous (Nelson, A. Thompson, Chanen, et al. 2013), with high 
degree of comorbidity (Fusar-Poli, Nelson, et al. 2014) and pluripotent (Schultze-Lutter et 
al. 2013) and diverse diagnostic and functional outcomes (Carrión et al. 2013; Fusar-Poli, 
Nelson, et al. 2014). Prospective studies with larger samples are fundamental to endorse 
these considerations and to test if TS predicts clinical outcomes in UHR subjects. 
The presence of TS in the UHR sample was associated with higher PANSS general 
psychopathology scores. As with the previous heterogeneity claim, if replicated in larger and 
longitudinal studies, this result would add clinical value to this cluster suggesting that it 
might be a “symptom”. That is, to hypothesize that TS could be not only a phenomenon 
occurring in the UHR subjects but also a protagonist in identifying a subgroup of UHR 
subjects that have higher psychopathology. Contrary to the expectations none of the other 
clinical measures were impacted by the presence of TS. Indeed, there was no statistical 
difference in SOFAS, PANNS positive symptoms and CAARMS scores in the sample UHR 
subjects with or without TS. These results diverge from the clinical consideration that TS 
matures with a severe disruption of engagement (connection) and enactment (understanding) 
of reality and is associated with diminished functioning and a change in overall contact with 
reality (engagement and meaning). Most of these changes would be contained in the PANSS 
positive symptoms domain which include questions on perception of reality, derealization 
and perplexity (see relevant conceptualization of delusional mood and perceptual anomalies 
in (Fuchs 2005a)). The first possible speculation is that all of these negative findings are due 
to a type II error. An alternative hypothesis, stands upon the possible lack of sensitivity of 
the PANSS to measure attenuated and moderate psychotic symptoms sufficiently which 
distress the UHR subjects (Fusar-Poli, Yung, et al. 2014). However the latter explanation is 
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weakened as the CAARMS and the SOFAS are specific instruments for the UHR 
psychopathology and the TS status did not differentiate the UHR group in any of the 
CAARMS specific domain scores neither in their SOFAS scores. However, it is possible to 
argue that the CAARMS is focused on positive symptoms and does not investigate 
abnormalities of self-awareness; therefore such non-psychotic alterations may not be 
reflected in the instrument’s scores. 
We also investigated basic self-disturbances, as assessed by the EASE total score that had 
been shown to be relevant for the overall risk of psychosis in the UHR group (Nelson et al. 
2009; Nelson, A. Thompson, Chanen, et al. 2013; Nelson et al. 2012). In this UHR sample 
similar scores of basic self-disturbances were found in subjects with or without TS. These 
results might represent a false negative due to the small sample size as it was expected higher 
overall scores in subjects with TS or they can result from the lack of clear message or grasp 
of this heterogeneous and complex variable (TS). Here was envisioned that the group with 
TS would have more severe self-awareness impairment and thus more prone to a disruption 
of engagement and understanding of reality. Yet these findings also allow the understanding 
in which TS and basic self-disturbances constructs occur in specific and not overlapping 
cohorts of UHR subjects. This assessment showed that scores of the 
demarcation/transitivism and existential reorientation EASE subscales were higher in 
subjects with TS. Only longitudinal studies could sustain this relation and if a specific 
combination of basic self-disturbances occur in subjects with TS. However, even if it was 
possible, eventually, to ascertain this extra care must be taken as the existential reorientation 
domain of the EASE scale includes items that are similar to the TS construct.  
Another unexpected result was the average CDS score in the UHR risk group across their 
TS status. I expected higher scores in the subjects with TS due to the overlap of many of 
CDS items with the TS construct – e.g. “what I see looks 'flat' or 'lifeless', as if I were looking 
at a picture” or “my surroundings feel detached or unreal, as if there was a veil between me 
and the outside world” (Sierra & Berrios 2000). Again if I do not interpret these results as a 
false negative (either for sample size or the complexity of this variable), I can hypothesize 
that derealization and depersonalization experiences could lead to other subjective 
interpretations than the TS cluster. Indeed this would support the idea that TS are singular 
(and therefore clinically relevant) and that they are not just non-specific depersonalization 
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and derealization experiences found in anxiety (Sierra et al. 2012), depression (Mula et al. 
2007) or even trauma in general (Ludwig 1983). 
The third aim was to examine the correlation between the CDS and EASE scores to better 
understand the relation between derealization and depersonalization experiences and basic 
self-disturbances in the UHR population. Whilst derealization and depersonalization are 
taken to be non-specific, basic self-disturbances have been conceptualized as the core feature 
of the schizophrenic spectrum, and are therefore useful in distinguishing diagnostic 
outcomes (Nelson, A. Thompson, Chanen, et al. 2013; Parnas et al. 2011). In the whole UHR 
sample these two domains were closely related. This finding adds up to the idea that there 
could be an overlap in the portrayal of these phenomena. Indeed the results emphasize the 
word of caution which was recently put forward regarding the lack of phenomenological 
detail to separate “true basic self disturbances” from otherwise unspecified depersonalization 
and derealization experiences (Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 2013). At a phenomenological 
level, a full overlap would render narratives of general derealization and depersonalization 
experiences an important confounding factor to narratives suggesting disturbances of “basic-
self” (and schizophrenia proneness). A partial overlap, where a specific domain of CDS 
experiences is more prevalent in those describing high levels of “basic-self” disturbances, 
would maintain the idea that there is something particular to the derealization and 
depersonalization occurring in schizophrenia. Further studies might help clarify this question 
including those investigating the occurrence “basic-self” disturbances in other clinical 
populations (e.g. anxiety disorders) and their overlap with general derealization and 
depersonalization experiences. 
6. Limitations 
This study is limited by the small sample size and it should be considered exploratory. Here 
are listed several major limitations: (1) it cannot be dismissed that these results are false 
negatives or false positives due to the sample size; (2) that there is a conceptual and empirical 
heterogeneity of the UHR construct (Fusar-Poli, Yung, et al. 2014) that can further impair 
the use of these results for other UHR populations (3) that the assessment of TS needs to be 
replicated in other UHR findings to allow generalizability of results; (4) that the differences 
in employment rates are a possible confounding factor to the results, yet they seemed to us 
represent an artefact of the process of selection of the UHR group (the use of SOFAS for 
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functioning); (5) that there are no follow up results, which would help to better define the 
clinical relevance of TS - they could clarify if TS are general experiences (accounting for 
anxious and depressive symptoms) or indeed associated with specific experiences at the core 
of psychosis proneness, (6) that the lack of a clinical control group (e.g. affective, anxious 
or personality disorders); (7) that although the use of prescribed drugs and of illicit 
substances was systematically appraised, their effect on the results could not be determined 
due to small numbers (we have fully investigated these issues in a separate publication 
(Fusar-Poli et al. 2015); (8) that here TS were not analysed in light of cultural influences. 
For example the Truman explanation could be a modern way to conceptualize the experience 
influenced by social media or TV - an analysis of these factors could perhaps allow us to 
understand if TS are specific to a subset of UHR subject intensely using social media and 
watching TV shows; (9) that only two UHR clinics were used and the prevalence of UHR in 
the population might be limited by the specifics of the population. On a personal note, the 
author takes that TS is a complex and heterogenous variable which, for times, needed 
comprehensive discussion of all its details in order to obtain true joint understanding – 
limiting the unrestricted use of the variable in clinical practice as well as might restraining 
the results of this arm of the study. 
7. Partial Synthesis
This is the first study to explore the prevalence and implications of Truman symptoms in a 
UHR population. TS were prevalent in in this UHR sample and were absent in matched 
HC’s. The UHR subjects with TS had similar scores to the UHR without TS in the EASE, 
SOFAS, CDS, CAARMS, PANSS, with the exception of higher score on Existential 
Reorientation and Demarcation/transitivism EASE subscales and General Psychopathology 
PANSS subscale in the UHR-TS+ group. Within the whole UHR sample, EASE and CDS 
scores were correlated. Future studies, both prospective and with larger samples, are 
fundamental to endorse these considerations and to test if TS predicts clinical outcomes or 
treatment response in UHR subjects. 
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Chapter 3: Abnormal Bodily Phenomena in subjects at High 
Clinical Risk for Psychosis 
1. Summary
Contemporary phenomenological research has considered abnormal bodily phenomena 
(ABP) to be a phenotypic trait of subjects with schizophrenia in their first psychotic episode. 
Yet the prevalence of ABP and their clinical significance in subjects at High-Risk (HR) of 
psychosis remains unidentified. This study is an exploratory investigation of ABP in HR 
subjects and matched healthy controls (HC) examining their relation to clinical features and 
basic self-disturbances. Here is tested a sample of 26 HR and 14 HC subjects from three 
prodromal and early intervention clinics in South London, West London and Cambridge was 
assessed with the Abnormal Bodily Phenomena questionnaire (ABPq), Comprehensive 
Assessment of At-Risk Mental States (CAARMS), the Positive and Negative Syndrome 
Scale (PANSS), the Social and Occupational Functioning Assessment Scale (SOFAS) and 
the Examination of Anomalous Self Experiences (EASE) checklist.  
In this sample, ABP occurred in 73.1% of HR subjects and prominent ABP (proABP) were 
referred in 53.8% of them. No HC subject reported ABP. The HR group with proABP had 
lower CAARMS total score (t=-9.265, p=0.006). There were no differences in PANSS total 
score (t=-1.235, p=0.277), SOFAS score (H(2) 22.27, p=0.666) and EASE total scores 
(z=8.565, adjusted p=0.185) in the HR subjects with prominent ABP versus those that did 
not. This initial investigation suggests that ABP could be a prevalent phenotypic feature of 
HR subjects and the clinical implications of this are discussed. 
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2. Introduction  
Abnormal bodily phenomena (ABP) have been examined in patients with psychosis and 
particularly schizophrenia even in their seminal representations (Jaspers 1963). ABP are 
considered to include several different types of symptoms: disturbed coenesthesia (an 
assortment of uncanny bodily feelings with or without delusional interpretation), kinesthetic 
hallucinations and disruptions of body structure and boundaries. As a group, ABP are 
subjective phenomena that may be quasi-ineffable in nature and until recently they have 
been absent from diagnostic textbooks as we lack sensible, specific and reliable tools to 
assess them. 
Following increasing evidence of the limitations of standardized criteria as well as fully 
structured interviews (Stanghellini 2009a) (Nordgaard et al. 2013), the development of 
phenomenologically-based, semi-structured interviews has allowed a better insight into 
subjective phenomena (Parnas et al. 2008). This is the case of the EASE interview (Parnas, 
Handest, et al. 2005) which focuses on anomalous subjective self experiences (ASE), the 
use of which has become increasingly relevant in research on psychosis (Møller et al. 2011) 
and schizophrenia (Sass 2003) (Parnas, Handest, et al. 2005). The concept of “self” has 
brought about major interdisciplinary interaction aiming to find common conceptual ground 
for research. One of the present conceptions takes the self as a pyramidal structure with three 
elements: the pre-reflexive (the “basic” experiences which implicitly compose one’s way of 
being in the world), reflexive (the cognitive appraisal of oneself and the world) and narrative 
(the autobiography which one narrates when portraying oneself). The three elements are 
interlinked in such a way that a disturbance in pre-reflexive experience of the self could lead 
to disturbances of other levels of self-experience. There are major inputs to this conception 
from various authors including Joseph Parnas, Louis Sass, Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher 
(Sass 2013; S. Gallagher 2011; Sass 2003; Zahavi 2014; Kircher & David 2003). The 
“Anomalous self-experiences” selected by the EASE are an heterogeneous group of 
phenomena which involve symptoms such as: subjectively experiencing a disturbed way of 
thinking, subjectively experiencing a disturbed way of being in the world, subjectively 
experiencing disturbances to one’s own body, disturbances in interpersonal relations and 
disturbances in principles and attitudes to the world. The EASE interview has shown a good 
internal and external validity and its use in subjects at high-risk of psychosis (Nelson et al. 
2012; Nelson et al. 2009; Nelson, A. Thompson, Chanen, et al. 2013; Nelson, A. Thompson 
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& Yung 2013) and in prodromal phases of schizophrenia (Parnas 2005; Nelson et al. 2012) 
has shown that ASE are present in these populations and suggested they could be used as an 
early marker.  
A similar research track has 
now explored the prevalence 
and relevance of ABP in 
patients with first psychotic 
episode and, in particular, in 
subjects with diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (Stanghellini et 
al. 2012) (Stanghellini, 
Ballerini, Blasi, et al. 2014). 
The “Abnormal Bodily 
Phenomena Questionnaire” 
(ABPq) (Stanghellini, 
Ballerini & Cutting 2014; 
Stanghellini, Ballerini, Blasi, 
et al. 2014) allows a 
systematized enquiry in to 
these experiences. Studies 
using ABPq have shown an 
assortment of bodily 
phenomena occurring in 
schizophrenia (Stanghellini, 
Ballerini, Blasi, et al. 2014) 
and the in the first episode 
psychosis (Stanghellini et al. 
2012). These include uncanny 
feelings of numbness, loss of 
body vitality, the sense of disappearance of parts, change in form (shrinking or enlargement), 
dimension unusual heaviness or lightness) or even “movement of internal parts” of the body 
Experience of violation “when he stretched his hand I felt an 
energy entering my body. That energy was pounding my right 
side until it break in” 
Experience of externalization “I felt that my body had become 
as a boiling soup and I was no longer in control of my energy 
that flows around me. Then my body became an ingredient in 
the soup parts of me are the vapors and rest of the soup ” 
Morbid objectivization “I felt my brain freezing. Then 
thoughts were moving so slowly I could feel them drive from 
ear to ear” 
Devitalization “The loss of the animal part in me, I lost it! I feel 
that I act as I was programmed, even eating and I feel like a 
robot, even my arms feel artificially attached to me” 
Experience of internal dynamization “I felt my brain starting 
to rotate, only slightly, but to a point where I was worried it 
would detach from my neck and it was going to fall to the floor” 
Experience of transformation “I felt that my hands were 
shifting as I moved them towards my face – bigger than smaller. 
Such a scary sense that I had to look away” 
Dysmorphophobia “I always felt my left part of my body was 
not ok. I even wondered that it might not be mine. There is a 
sense of evil from the left side. I feel that it’s evil” 
Disesthesic paroxysm “blurring feeling on my cheek and neck 
when someone speaks to me. I cannot describe it but its 
sufficiently awkward for me to be scared of being too close” 
Recurrent pain-like experience “the pain just comes and 
goes… normally when I’m breathing I can end up feeling 
needles in the lung. I know wrong kind of pain as its so different. 
it doesn’t help taking anything”  
Table 5 Example of Abnormal Bodily Phenomena 
(sample) 
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(Ey 1973; Stanghellini et al. 2012; Dupré 1925). Examples of these phenomena are presented 
in the Table 4.  
Various studies suggest that ABP occur as trait features before the first psychotic episode in 
patients with schizophrenia (Hemsley 1998; Klosterkötter et al. 2001; Röhricht & Priebe 
2002; Stanghellini 2009b; Schultze-Lutter, Ruhrmann, et al. 2007; Gallese & Ferri 2013). 
The Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental State scale [31], one of the instruments 
relevant to the HR profile, also selects disturbances of bodily phenomena. Yet no study has 
independently regarded their presence and clinical significance in subjects at high-risk of 
psychosis. Therefore their occurrence and phenotypic profile is unknown, as is their relation 
with other presenting symptoms.  
This study used the ABPq to appraise ABP in a sample of subjects at High Risk of Psychosis 
(HR) and assess their occurrence in this population. The first goal was to measure the 
prevalence of ABP in HR group and matched healthy controls (HC). The second goal was 
to see how the presence of ABP was related to other clinical features in this population 
including (i) functional features (SOFAS), (ii) HR symptoms (PANSS and CAARMS) and 
(iii) disturbance of basic self-experiences (EASE).  
3. Methods  
3.1 Setting and sample 
This sample included subjects at High Clinical Risk for psychosis from OASIS (prodromal 
clinic, SLaM NHS Foundation Trust, London (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013)), West London Early 
Intervention and CAMEO (“Cambridge Early Onset”, Cambridge University, Cambridge, 
UK) teams. These clinics are responsible for early intervention in young adults where they 
undertake a detailed multidisciplinary assessment including combined review of clinical 
judgment and screening instruments (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013). The ABP and EASE semi-
structured clinical interviews were added. Their HR group is defined by High-Risk criteria 
derived from Comprehensive Assessment of At Risk Mental State (CAARMS) (Yung et al. 
2005) and the Social and Occupation Functioning Assessment Scale (SOFAS) (Goldman et 
al. 1992). Some features of the sample included: subjects were between 18 and 35 years of 
age, 65% of the subjects had never used drugs while 12.5% had experimented and 15% had 
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moderate to severe use 22.5% were taking antidepressants while 7.5% were taking 
antipsychotics. After an average of 28 months of follow-up (November 2015) two of the HR 
subjects transitioned to a psychotic episode. Enrollment process for controls included 
advertisement for those matched for age and gender subjects and that had no present or past 
personal or family psychiatric history. This study had ethical approval and all the subjects 
participated after signing a written voluntary informed consent form. 
3.2 Procedure: 
In this study, detailed semi-structured interviews were performed by two psychiatrists (LM 
and IB) blind to clinical diagnosis. They have strong training in Psychopathology and a 
cthese in using the EASE (semi-structured interview similar to the Abnormal Bodily 
Phenomena questionnaire). Joint scoring of audio-recorded interviews ensured inter-raters 
reliability. The final scores were decided through consensus discussion. 
3.3 Sociodemographics 
In line with previous OASIS studies, socio-demographic data was collected from the 
subjects’ clinical file. These included age, gender, education, personal or family history of 
psychiatric disorder and present or past psychiatric treatment, country of birth and 
employment (full time students were considered employed). (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013). Healthy 
controls were asked the same questions during the interviews. The sample was recruited 
between August 2013 and November 2013. 
3.4 Clinical Measures 
Anomalous Bodily Phenomena Questionnaire (ABPq) (Stanghellini, Ballerini & Cutting 
2014)  
The prevalence of ABP was assessed with the ABPq, a nine items semi-structured interview 
split into five sections: Demarcation (experience of violation and externalisation), Vitality 
(morbid objectivisation and devitalisation), Coherence (experience of internal 
dynamisation), Identity (experience of transformation and dysmorphophobia) and Activity 
(disesthesic paroxysm and recurrent pain-like experiences). Each item is scored for its 
frequency, intensity, impairment and coping in 7 point assessment scale. The developers of 
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ABPq proposed that we should acknowledge the overall score as the sum of all scores and 
the presence of “prominent ABP” (proABP) in subjects with scores over 3 in any of the 
domains. Selected examples of patients’ answers are present in the introduction textbox. 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay et al. 1987):  
A seven-point assessment of 30 items split into three sections: 7 positive, 7 negative and 16 
general psychopathology items. It was part of the assessment at admission in the OASIS and 
CAMEO teams. In this study it allowed the assessment of general psychopathology and 
positive and negative symptoms and their relation to ABP.  
Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental State (CAARMS) (Yung et al. 2005)  
A semi-structured clinical interview for attenuated psychotic symptoms (thought 
disturbances and perceptual abnormalities), which is part of the assessment of OASIS and 
CAMEO teams. It has 26 items divided across 7 subscales: 4 Positive Symptom items, 2 
Cognitive and 3 Emotional Disturbances items, 3 Negative Symptoms items, 4 Behavioral 
Change items, 4 Motor/Physical Changes items, and 8 General Psychopathology items. 
These are rated on severity and frequency of the symptom in a 6-point assessment (from 0 
absent/never to 6 psychotic and severe/continuous). 
Social and Occupation Functioning Assessment Scale (SOFAS) (Goldman et al. 1992)  
This scale is a modified version of the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale 
separating the measures of social and occupational functioning from the measures of 
symptoms and psychological functioning. Its scores range from 0 to 100. Scoring is 
according to information obtained in the psychiatric interview. 
Examination of Anomalous Self Experiences checklist (EASE) (Parnas, Møller, et al. 2005) 
It is a semi-structured interview for anomalous subjective experience that includes 57 items 
(88 if sub-items) and a Cronbach α of 0,87 (Møller et al. 2011). It is divided into five 
subscales a) 28 sub-items cognition and stream of consciousness; b) 36 sub-items in self-
awareness and presence; c) 16 sub-items in bodily experiences; d) 6 sub-items in 
demarcation/transitivism; e) 8 sub-items in existential reorientation. The score was an 
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overall dichotomous score in accordance to presence (1) or absence (0) of items. It is a 
reliable instrument to inquiry anomalous experiences of the “pre-reflexive” sense of first-
person perspective or basic self (Møller et al. 2011). They have been empirically 
substantiated in a) early psychosis (Parnas, Handest, et al. 2005), b) prodromal phases of 
psychosis (Parnas et al. 1998; Nelson et al. 2012) and c) in the schizotypic and those with 
schizotaxia (Raballo & Parnas 2011). The abnormalities of self-awareness have been shown 
as promising in the conceptualization of those at risk of psychosis (Nelson et al. 2008) and 
in schizophrenia-prone individuals (Parnas 2005; Nelson, A. Thompson & Yung 2013). 
3.5 Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive statistics including ANOVA and t-tests for continuous variables and Fisher exact 
test for categorical variables were used to compare between group differences. Non-
parametric tests were used as appropriate when the assumptions for parametric null 
hypothesis tests were violated. Here inter-rater reliability was tested by independent 
reevaluation of the tape recording of the first 6 interviews (three interviews performed by IB 
and three by LM which were subsequently evaluated by the other interviewer). 
The first aim was to measure the prevalence of ABP and proABP in HR subjects and 
matched HC. The second aim was to investigate if the presence of proABP affected clinical 
features of HR including a) HR symptoms (CAARMS and PANSS scores), b) functional 
status (SOFAS score) and c) disturbance of basic self-experiences (EASE score). For 
CAARMS and PANSS scores, as normality assumption was maintained, t-tests were used 
to compare HRproABP- or HRproABP+ groups. For SOFAS and EASE scores, as the 
assumption of normality and homogeneity of variance were violated (Shapiro-Wilk test 
significant in at least one group for each variable, p<0.05; Levene test significant in every 
variable but EASE Existential Reorientation subscale, p<0.05) so Kruskal-Wallis non-
parametric test was chosen to compare HC, HRproABP- and HRproABP+. For post-hoc 
analysis Dunn-Bonferroni’s approach (Dunn 1964) was used for multiple comparisons in 
non-parametric test. When not otherwise specified, two-side p<0.05 was considered 
significant. Given the exploratory nature of this study and the small sample size, it was 
decided not to control for familywise error rate. This decision was made to avoid loss of 
statistical power. However, here was also performed a Bonferroni correction in the post-hoc 
analysis given the large increase in the number of null hypothesis formulated in this 
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procedure. The adjusted p-value (p * number of pairwise comparisons) has been reported. 
All the analyses were performed under SPSS IBM 22.  
4. Results  
4.1 Sociodemographic characteristics 
Interviews took on average 58 min (SD=10) in HC and 134 min (SD=40) in HR subjects. 
The inter-rater correlation was 0.90 (p<0.001) overall. The sample comprised 26 HR 
subjects with mean age of 23.73 years (SD 4.35) and of which 57% were male. The matching 
sample of HC participants presented no differences on baseline demographics, accounted in 
Table 6, but the employment rate was higher in HC than HR (Fisher’s exact test 6.983, 
p=0.029). 
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or n (%) 










or n (%) 
Age at 
inclusion 






38 (95) 13 (92.9) 12 (100)  13 (92.9) 
Other 2 (5) 1 (7.1) - 1(7.1) 
Gender 3.048 p=0.236 
Male 19 (47.5) 4 (28.6) 7 (41.7)  8 (57.1) 
Female 21 (52.5) 10 (71.4) 5 (23.8)  6 (42.9) 
Ethnicity 1.014 p=0.707 
White British 24 (60) 10 (71.4) 7 (58.3)  7 (53.8) 
Other 15 (37.5) 4 (28.6) 5 (41.7)  6 (46.2) 




Yes 27 (67.5) 13 (92.9) 8 (66.7)  6 (46.2) 
No 12 (30) 1 (7.1) 4 (33.3)  7 (58.3) 





14.78±2.91 16.14±3.44 15.08±1.83 13.04±2.33 4.565 p=0.017 
number of subjects or Mean ± SD. Percentages under parenthesis. p-values refer to ANOVA and Fisher’s Exact 
Test between HC, HRproABP- and HRproABP+ group for continuous and categorical values respectively 
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 4.2 Prevalence of ABP and proABP and average ABPq score  
In this sample, ABP were absent in all subjects in HC group and were found in 19 (73.1%) 
HR subjects where its overall score (mean, SD) was 35.43±35.80. These represent subjects 
with several ABP, which they evaluated in their frequency, intensity and impairment and to 
which they discussed the coping strategies. Regarding the individual domain scores, HR 
sample subjects reported (mean±SD) a disturbance in ego demarcation score of 4.84±9.76, 
a disturbance in ego vitality score of 9.0±10.47, a disturbance in ego coherence score of 
3.00±6.26, a disturbance in ego Identity score of 8.05±12.86 and a disturbance in ego activity 
score of 10.53±9.36. The scoring system allowed the identification of 14 subjects (53.8%) 
with prominent ABP and hereinafter the acronym HRproABP+ represents these subjects 
while HRproABP- represents those that had no ABP or that considered them mild. 
4.3 EASE, SOFAS, CAARMS and PANSS scores across HC, HRproABP+ and 
HRproABP- groups 
There were statistically significant differences in EASE total and specific scores across the 
three groups of HC, HRproABP- and HRproABP+. Table 7 portrays EASE and SOFAS 
scores across HC, HRproABP- and HRproABP+ groups. The post-hoc analysis between 
HRproABP- and HRproABP+ groups showed no differences between their SOFAS score 
(z=-1.371, p=1.00) and their EASE total score (z=8.565, adjusted p=0.185). Figure 4 
displays sample distribution of EASE scores across HC, HRproABP- and HRproABP+ 
groups. 
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Three groups were compared and considering the non-normal distribution of data and heterogeneity of 
variance, the Kruskal–Wallis non-parametric test was adopted. Median (with range) and mean rank for each 
group are reported. P values correspond to differences between the three groups. Abbreviations: HC: Healthy 
controls; HRproABP+: HR subjects with prominent ABP; HRproABP-: HR subjects with no prominent ABP  
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Figure 4: Examination of Anomalous Self Experiences Scores in HC, HRproABP- and 
HRproABP+ 
The three groups differed for total EASE score (N=40, H(2)=29.570, p<0.001) 
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In the sample the HRproABP+ vs HRproABP- subjects had on average lower CAARMS 
total score (HRproABP- 41.42±12.32, HRproABP+ 36.36±24.23, t=-9.265 (24), p=0.006). 
There were no statistically significant differences in PANSS total score between those 
groups (HRproABP-=51.33±12.72, HRproABP+=54.07±17.04, t=-1.235 (24), p=0.277). 
Table 8 details the differences between PANSS and CAARMS specific domain scores 
across HRproABP+ and HRproABP- groups. 







t (24) p value 
PANSS Positive Symptoms 12.17±3.90 13.29±4.14 -0.705 p=0.487 
PANSS Negative Symptoms 12.25±4.84 12.07±4.95 0.093 p=0.927 
PANSS General Psychopathology 26.83±7.15 28.81±9.89 -0.547 p=0.589 
CAARMS Positive Symptoms 8.83±4.46 7.86±3.48 0.306 p=0.762 
CAARMS Cognitive Disturbances 3.50±1.93 1.93±1.82 2.111 p=0.045* 
CAARMS Emotional Disturbances 3.08±2.93 2.93±2.98 0.129 p=0.899 
CAARMS Negative symptoms 6.25±3.36 4.14±3.35 1.597 p=0.123 
CAARMS Behavioral Changes 5.58±3.75 5.93±4.92 -0.198 p=0.844 
CAARMS Motor/Physical 
Changes 
1.17±2.29 2.29±3.99 -0.857 p=0.400 
CAARMS General 
Psychopathology 
13.50±5.99 11.29±7.80 0.802 p=0.430 
* Significant difference (2-sided p<0.05)
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5. Discussion
This is a preliminary study exploring the prevalence and the impact of ABP on other clinical 
features in HR subjects. In the sample, ABP were specific and highly prevalent in HR 
subjects - more than half of the HR subjects showed prominent ABP. There were significant 
differences in EASE scores across HC, HRproABP- and HRproABP+. Yet subjects with 
prominent ABP (versus other HR subjects) only differ in their CAARMS overall score 
(which was lower) while they did not in their EASE total, PANSS and SOFAs scores. 
Prospective studies with larger samples are fundamental to endorse these considerations and 
to test if ABP predicts clinical outcomes in UHR subjects.” 
The first aim was to determine if ABP were present in the HR subjects. 73% of these sample 
subjects experienced ABP and ~53% experienced prominent ABP. This feature contrasted 
with HC group that reported no ABP. This allowed the speculation that ABP might be a 
phenotypic marker of psychosis vulnerability, which only further studies with larger samples 
and with clinical control group can show. Still, as much as 30% of the sample had no ABP 
and 50% had no prominent ABP. This seems attuned to the fact that the HR is heterogeneous, 
presents various comorbidities and has diverse diagnostic and functional outcomes [13]. 
The second aim was to determine if ABP impacted on clinical features of the HR population. 
The presence of proABP status did not differentiate the HR sample across PANSS and 
SOFAS scores and that proABP subjects had lower CAARMS overall score. Again due to 
the small sample size in the study, the ABP value as a clinical feature remains unknown. Yet 
the lower CAARMS scores made us raise the possibility that ABPq might assess phenomena 
unlike other criteria defining HR for psychosis (including bodily phenomena considered in 
the CAARMS) as 50% of the HR sample had prominent ABP and lower CAARMS score 
was found.  
The third aim was to test the relation between ABP and anomalous subjective self-
experiences. The HR group had higher EASE scores compared to controls. This is in line 
with previous evidence showing the presence of ASE in the HR group (Nelson et al. 2012; 
Nelson et al. 2009) and the possibility that they segregate the HR subjects at risk of 
schizophrenia (Nelson, A. Thompson & Yung 2013). In the sample subjects referring 
prominent ABP did not have significantly higher EASE scores. This may be due to weak 
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statistical power due to small group size in each group and further studies with larger samples 
are need to clarify this issue. It should not be understated that the relation between ABPq 
and EASE interview also occurs at phenomenological level and it is important to elucidate 
if they are overlapping constructs or if one is a sub-construct of the other. There are studies 
suggesting that ASE lead to ABP (Kircher & David 2003) while others advocate that ABP 
antecede the occurrence of ASE (Scharfetter 1981; Kato & Ishiguro 1997). This “causative 
relation” is yet to be clarified and needs further investigation. It seems important to stress 
that the bodily phenomena assessed by the ABPq and the EASE interview are different – for 
instance “internal dynamism” item only appears in the first and the “mirror-effect” is only 
materialized in the second – and might carry distinctive implications. An overall better 
conceptualization of the mutual implications between ABP and ASE is needed.  
6. Limitations
First, due to the small sample size, the study should be considered as an exploratory study. 
It is not possible to exclude that the results could be false negatives or false positives. The 
generalization of the results might be limited by the specifics of the sample as only two HR 
clinics were used. Along these limitations, which are specific to the study, it must be 
considered that the HR construct has shown conceptual and empirical heterogeneity further 
limiting the relevance of the results to other HR populations (Schultze-Lutter et al. 2013). 
The difference in employment rates across the sample groups seemed to be an artefact of the 
process of selection of the HR group (the use of SOFAS for functioning). A clinical control 
group (e.g. affective, anxious or personality disorders) and follow-up data are necessary to 
better define the clinical relevance of ABP. Lastly, prescribed drugs and illicit substances 
were appraised and yet the small sample size did not allow the determination of their effect 
on the scores. 
7. Partial Synthesis
This is the first study to explore the prevalence and implications of Abnormal Bodily 
Phenomena in subjects considered at high risk of psychosis. In the HR sample ABP were 
highly prevalent (while absent from matched HC) and in 50% of subjects prominent ABP 
were found. It raised the possibility that ABP could be a phenotypic component of HR 
psychopathology and particularly of a subgroup of these subjects. Future prospective and 
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with larger samples studies are necessary before endorsing these considerations and 
particularly, to understand if ABP predicts clinical outcomes or treatment response in HR 
subjects. 
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Chapter 4: Basic-self disturbances in Panic Disorder 
1. General Summary
A key purpose of the present arm of the study — the first to examine anomalous self-
experiences (ASEs) in panic disorder — is to begin exploring this self-related dimension of 
anxiety disorders. Another is to help clarify precisely what might, or might not, be specific 
to the schizophrenia-spectrum domain (where ASE has previously been identified) — which, 
in turn, could be useful for developing pathogenetic models for various disorders. Here was 
recruited a sample of 47 Panic Disorder (PD) patients (with follow-up at a Hospital 
Outpatient Clinic) and 47 healthy control (HC) subjects from the North Lisbon Central 
Hospital (C.H.L.N.), which was assessed with the Examination of Anomalous Self 
Experiences (EASE) checklist and Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS). This arm of 
the study reports that all patients in the PD sample had ASE and their EASE scores were 
significantly higher than in the HC (17.94± SD 11.88 vs HC 1.00± SD 1.81).  This PD 
sample also had much higher EASE scores than those found in previous EASE studies of 
bipolar psychosis or other mental disorders (averages of 6.3 and 8.1, p<0.005), though 
somewhat lower than scores found in previous EASE studies of schizophrenia-spectrum 
patients (average EASE scores of 25.3, 21.4, 19.6, p<0.005). The distribution of EASE items 
and sub-items in the PD sample was heterogeneous, varying from rare (<10%) or absent 
(termed “discrepancies” with schizophrenia-spectrum: 29 items) to being present in >50% 
of subjects (“affinities” with schizophrenia spectrum: 7 items). As predicted, EASE and CDS 
scores were correlated (r=0.756, 95% CI 0.665-0.840). These results show that ASE can be 
prevalent in Panic Disorder, including disturbances of self-awareness, body experience, and 
thought. Panic Disorder patients showed many common forms of derealization and 
depersonalization—perhaps involving more “secondary” and defensive psychological 
processes. They tended however to lack indicators suggesting truly profound distortion of 
the normal “transcendental” conditions of consciousness (i.e., as concerning the very 
constitution of subjective life or “basic self”) that might constitute a more “primary” factor 
in schizophrenia, namely: 1) profoundly diminished sense of self-presence: 2) loss of the 
sense of existing as an independent entity (e.g., involving “confusion with the other”) 3) 
solipsistic experiences of being the center of the universe, and 4) extreme reifications of 
subjective life). In this sense PD subjects appear similar to subjects with Depersonalization 
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Disorder or engaged in Introspection. Overall, the findings support the ipseity-disturbance 
or basic-self disturbance model of schizophrenia, while also indicating the need for careful 
phenomenological exploration of self-anomalies in order to distinguish transnosological 
“psychotic-like phenomena” from those of true psychotic or schizophrenic conditions.  
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2. Introduction
Anomalous self experiences (ASEs), presumably involving alterations in “core” or “minimal 
self,” have been intensively studied in recent years—primarily as manifest in the 
schizophrenia spectrum, and as set in contrast with affective psychoses (especially bipolar) 
or psychopathology in general. The present study is the first to examine ASEs in Panic 
Disorder. The chief purpose is to begin exploring anomalous self-experience in the realm of 
anxiety disorders, and to further the knowledge of panic disorder in particular. An ancillary 
purpose is to help clarify precisely what might, or might not, be specific to the schizophrenia 
domain—which, in turn, could be useful for developing pathogenetic models for various 
disorders.  
We will particularly emphasize depersonalization/derealization (d&d) experiences. These 
phenomena, which figure prominently among the ASEs, have long been recognized as 
common in psychosis and especially schizophrenia(Bleuler 1950),(Kraepelin & Lange 
1927),(Berze & Gruhle 1929). Yet d&d experiences are found in several disorders, with 
chronic d&d having high prevalence(Aderibigbe et al. 2001) and with anxiety-inducing and 
traumatic situations serving as important triggers to these forms of what one author has 
termed “loss of the self”(Simeon & Abugel 2008).   
Clinical research on ASE has primarily been conducted with the EASE: Examination of 
Anomalous Self Experiences, a semi-structured interview that operationalizes these 
anomalous experiences with a checklist of qualitative features(Parnas, Møller, et al. 
2005),(Møller et al. 2011). Many EASE items clearly involve experiences that correspond 
to classic conceptions of depersonalization and derealization (see further in the CDS 
interview on Procedure section). Yet there is a particular relevance of Anomalous Self 
Experiences (ASEs) that has been conceptually(Sass & Parnas 2003; Kircher & David 
2003), clinically(Raballo et al. 2011), and neurobiologically substantiated(Nelson et al. 
2009; Kapur 2014),(Kircher & David 2003),(Taylor 2011). Moreover EASE research has 
identified ASEs in schizophrenia(Parnas, Møller, et al. 2005), in persons with schizotypic 
and schizotaxic traits(Raballo & Parnas 2011), in first-episode psychosis(Møller et al. 2011; 
Sass 2014), and in prodromal phases (Nelson et al. 2012),(Parnas et al. 1998),(Klosterkötter 
et al. 2001),(Nelson et al. 2009) . ASEs have also been shown to be quite rare both in other 
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functional psychoses(Parnas 2005),(Parnas et al. 2003),(Parnas, Handest, et al. 2005) and in 
a general personality-disorder sample(Nelson, A. Thompson, Chanen, et al. 2013).  
It should be noted that EASE interviews focus on enduring or trait-like features rather than 
on experiences that occur only during psychotic episodes(Parnas, Møller, et al. 2005) (or in 
the case of the PD sample, panic episodes). Given their apparent trait-like nature, such 
anomalies (which involve an altered sense of engagement or attunement to oneself and the 
world) hold promise for identifying those at ultra-high risk (Nelson et al. 2009),(Nelson et 
al. 2012) or schizophrenia-prone individuals (Nelson, A. Thompson & Yung 2013),(Parnas 
2005).  
Some reservations do however remain regarding the use of ASEs as markers of psychosis 
risk or schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. One problem is the seeming overlap between ASE 
and depersonalization/derealization experiences—given that the latter experiences: 1) are 
the third most common psychopathological symptom (after anxiety and depressive mood) 
and occur in non-schizophrenic pathologies, including anxiety disorders, depressive 
disorders(Brauer et al. 1970), and Depersonalization Disorder itself(Simeon et al. 1997); 2) 
show phenomenological complexity(Simeon et al. 2008),(Simeon & Abugel 2008); and 3) 
can be conceptualized dimensionally, and may occur as normal adaptive reactions to 
anxiety-provoking situations or even as voluntary responses (e.g., in introspection or 
meditation(Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013)). All this suggests the need to explore the 
possibility of specific patterns of ASE in more phenomenological detail, and also to clarify 
their presence and nature in non-schizophrenic(Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 2013) and non-
pathological as well as in schizophrenia-spectrum settings(Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013). 
Previous publications ((Sass 2014),(Borda & Sass 2015; Sass & Borda 2015)), backed by 
some empirical and quasi-empirical ((Hunt 1976),(Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013; Sass, 
Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 2013)) and review of neurocognitive findings (especially(Sass & 
Borda 2015)), distinguishes more primary from more secondary forms of self-disorder—
arguing that each form may be necessary (but not sufficient, taken alone) for the 
development of schizophrenia. The more secondary forms seem to involve consequential 
and especially defensive factors, and might be less distinctive of schizophrenia in particular; 
these secondary forms seem, in any case, to have close affinities with the dissociation or 
dissociation-like phenomena (including depersonalization/derealization) that occur in 
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Depersonalization Disorder and PTSD, or even with volitional or quasi-volitional forms of 
depersonalization characteristic of introspection or meditation. 
The present arm investigates anomalous subjective self-experiences in Panic Disorder (PD) 
and compares these with matched Healthy Controls (HC). Consistent with past uses of the 
EASE, only EASE items that occurred outside acute episodes of Panic Attacks1 were scored. 
The hypotheses were that ASEs would occur in patients with Panic Disorder: a) at a 
significantly higher level than in normal controls; and b) though at a lower level, on average, 
than that found previously in schizophrenia subjects. The third hypothesis was c) that, given 
the overlap in symptoms (especially in domains 1, 2 and 3), the number of ASEs would be 
correlated with the number of general depersonalization experiences. In addition, we 
intended to explore the profile of specific types of ASEs in PD patients. This implies 
considering the five, officially designated EASE domains (specified below), but also—and 
perhaps more importantly—any possible patterns of individual EASE items and sub-items 
that might be revealed; and analyzing these latter in light of the above-mentioned 
primary/secondary distinction and other theoretical considerations. Consistent with previous 
studies on introspectionism (Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013) and depersonalization 
disorder(Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 2013), it was considered “affinities” and 
“discrepancies” in the types of ASEs found in the PD subjects in comparison with those found 
in schizophrenia-spectrum samples.  
1 Here it was strictly considered EASE stipulations that state, in the case of two items, that the ASE 
item should not be rated (in the case of Derealization (2.5)) “after” or (in case of Primary Self-
Reference Phenomena (5.1)) “before” a “panic attack.” Also, with one exception, sub-items under the 
item Anxiety (2.13) were only rated when they occurred outside Panic Attacks. The exception is 
Subtype 1: panic attacks with autonomic symptoms (2.13.1)—which by definition involve panic 
attacks and had to be present in the panic-disorder subjects. 
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3. Methods 
3.1 Setting and sample 
The sample included 47 subjects diagnosed with Panic Disorder (ICD-10) and active panic 
attacks, all from Santa Maria Hospital Psychiatric Outpatient Clinic (CHLN – North Lisbon 
Central Hospital). The PD patients were all referred to the CHLN hospital from Primary 
Care facilities and the Emergency Departments only after there had been no symptomatic 
response after 1-month treatment with Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors; this sample 
was therefore somewhat more severe (or at least recalcitrant to standard treatment) than 
average for PD patients. Our patients were referred to a hospital setting where they were 
given the diagnosis of Panic Disorder and no other diagnosis. Our sample was selected under 
the inclusion criteria of no physical or psychiatric co-morbidity at the time of diagnosis. 
After admission subjects underwent screening instruments and a multidisciplinary 
assessment (psychiatric and psychological). They were not given, at any time of follow-up, 
the diagnosis of any other disorder, such as Affective or Schizophrenic disorders.  
PD subjects ranged from 20 to 75 years of age. 76% engaged in social drinking but none 
used alcohol on a regular basis. Although 85% of subjects had never used drugs, six subjects 
reported social cannabis consumption and one used this drug regularly. The 
psychopharmacological profile included antidepressants (93.61%), benzodiazepines 
(74.46%) and quetiapine (23%). On follow-up (average of 27 months; always greater than 
12 months), the diagnosis remained Panic Disorder.  
Control subjects were recruited via local advertisement requesting matching demographic 
features but absence of present or past personal or family psychiatric history. All subjects 
were recruited between August 2015 and December 2015; all signed a written voluntary 
informed consent form prior to participation. This study received ethical approval. 
3.2 Socio-demographics  
The Socio-demographic data included gender, age, country of birth, employment, education, 
present or past psychiatric treatment, and personal or family history of psychiatric disorder 
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(full-time students were considered employed). This information was gathered from the 
CHLN clinical file or, for control subjects, during research interviews.  
The sample comprised 47 PD subjects with mean age of 38.17 years (SD 13.66) of which 
31.9% were male. The matching sample of HC participants showed no differences on 
baseline demographics (see Table 9), except that employment rates and education were 
higher in HC than PD (respectively, F 0.040 p=0.020 0.002 p=0.001*)—a point addressed 
below.  












or n (%) 
F or 
Fisher’s p 
Age at inclusion 38.63±15.13 39.09±16.61 38.17±13.656 0.085 p=0.771 
Country of Birth 0.242 p=0.121 
Portugal 38 (95) 47 (100) 44 (93.6) 
Other 2 (5) 0 (0) 3 (6.4) 
Gender 0.520 p=0.260 
Male 34 (36.2) 19 (40.4) 15 (31.9) 
Female 60 (63.8) 28 (59.6) 32 (68.1) 
Ethnicity 1.000 p=0.692 
Caucasian 90 (95.7) 45 (95.7) 45 (95.7) 




Yes 80 (85.1) 44 (93.6) 36 (23.4) 
No 14 (30) 3 (6.4) 11 (76.6) 
Education 0.002 p=0.001* 
High-School 24 (25.5) 5 (10.6) 19 (40.4) 
Bachelor/Master 
degree 
70 (74.5) 42 (89.4) 28 (59.6) 
number of subjects or Mean ± SD. Percentages under parenthesis. p-values refer to ANOVA between HC and 
PD groups for continuous and categorical values respectively. * Significant difference (2-tailed p<0.05) 
3.3 Procedure 
Patients in the study were administered the EASE: Examination of Anomalous Self 
Experiences (a semi-structured, qualitatively rich, clinical interview), the Social and 
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Occupational Functioning Assessment (SOFA), and the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale 
(CDS, a structured clinical interview).  
Semi-structured interviews were always performed by two psychiatrists (LM and either SC 
or CC), who were blind to clinical diagnosis and had extensive training in psychopathology 
and a cthese in using the EASE. Scoring of 9 (out of 47) audio-recorded interviews, and joint 
discussion of difficulties and disparities, ensured inter-rater reliability. Also, in all cases 
where scoring proved problematic, EASE scores were assigned by consensus after joint 
discussion. 
3.4 Clinical Measures  
Social and Occupation Functioning Assessment Scale: SOFAS(Goldman et al. 1992) 
This modified version of the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale attempts to 
measure social and occupational functioning independently of symptoms and psychological 
functioning. SOFA Scores were based on information obtained in clinical records and 
psychiatric interview, and could range from 0 to 100. 
Examination of Anomalous Self Experiences checklist: EASE(Parnas, Møller, et al. 2005) 
This semi-structured interview for unusual subjective experiences is intended to investigate 
anomalous experiences primarily involving the “pre-reflective” sense of first-person 
perspective or basic self(Møller et al. 2011)—a.k.a. as “minimal” or “core” self. It has been 
translated into various languages, including Portuguese by Nelson Goldenstein and his 
research group. Interrater reliability is good, with a Cronbach α of 0,87(Møller et al. 2011). 
The EASE has 57 items, divided into five subscales with a total of 94 items and sub-items: 
a) 28 cognition and stream of consciousness items; b) 36 self-awareness and presence items; 
c) 16 bodily experiences items; d) 6 demarcation/transitivism items; e) 8 existential 
reorientation items. As in previous EASE research, scoring was dichotomous, indicating 
presence (1) or absence (0) of items. The use of the EASE included the examination of items 
(and sub-items) found in schizophrenia that were found to be either quite common 
(“affinities”) or quite rare (“discrepancies”) in this PD sample.   
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It should be noted that the “discrepancies” referred to below in the paper were 
operationalized in two distinct ways. In the previous studies of Depersonalization Disorder 
Disorder(Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 2013) and Introspectionism(Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 
2013) considered below, “discrepancy” referred to an EASE item that was not reported by 
any subject in the sample, and was therefore deemed “discrepant” with schizophrenia-
spectrum results (on which the EASE in based). In the PD sample in this study, 
“discrepancies” were defined as items or sub-items that were reported by <10% of the 
sample subjects.  
Since the previous vs current studies used different methods, they are not directly 
comparable.  The two previous studies were quasi-empirical in nature: they did not employ 
actual EASE interviews, but, rather, applied EASE categories to previously published self-
reports by persons with the conditions at issue. Subjects in those studies therefore had to 
mention EASE items spontaneously in their autobiographical accounts; individual EASE 
items were not systematically queried. The PD sample in the present study was thus more 
carefully probed for ASEs than in the prior Introspectionism(Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013) 
and Depersonalization-Disorder(Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 2013) studies. 
Cambridge Depersonalization Scale, (CDS)(Sierra & Berrios 2000) 
This 29-item self-report scale (Cronbach α of 0,89) measures the frequency and duration of 
depersonalization and derealization experiences. Frequency is rated from 0 (never) to 4 (all 
the time); duration from 1 (few seconds) to 6 (more than a week). It has been translated into 
Portuguese (also re-translated into English) and used in various research projects with 
Portuguese speakers. Comparison of EASE items with depersonalization/derealization items 
in the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale reveals two groups of d/d symptoms:  
 13 EASE items, all from Domains 1, 2, 3, were more or less identical with CDS items.
These include: Discordance between expression and expressed (1.16); Disturbance of
expressive language function (1.17); Distorted First Person Perspective Subtypes 1 and
2 (2.2.1 and 2.2.2); Melancholiform depersonalization (2.3.1); Diminished Presence
Subtype 1 (2.4.1); Dissociative Depersonalization Subtype 1 and 2 (2.8.1 and 2.8.2);
Morphological Change Subtypes 1 and 2 (3.1.1. and 3.1.2); Motor disturbances subtypes
1, 2 and 5 (3.8.1, 3.8.2 and 3.8.5).
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 11 EASE items, also from Domains 1, 2, 3, show a close affinity with CDS items.  These 
include: Thought interference (1.1); Loss of thought ipseity (1.2); Disturbance of thought 
initiative/intentionality (1.11); Disturbance of time experience Subtype 1 (1.14.1); 
Psychic Depersonalization: unspecified (2.3.2); Diminished Presence: distance to the 
world (2.4.2); Diminished Presence: as subtype 2 plus derealization (2.4.3); 
Derealization: fluid global derealization (2.5.1); Diminished transparency of 
consciousness (2.15); Somatic depersonalization (3.3); Psychophysical misfit / split 
(3.4). 
 
3.5 Statistical Analysis  
Descriptive statistics, including t-tests for continuous variables and Fisher's or Pearson chi^2 
for categorical variables, were used to consider between-group differences. Non-parametric 
tests were employed when the assumptions for parametric null hypothesis tests were 
violated.  
As a first aim it was measured the prevalence of ASE using the EASE in PD and matched 
HC subjects, considering both overall and individual-domain scores. Since the normality- 
and homogeneity-of-variance assumptions for the SOFAS and EASE were violated, it was 
performed Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests to compare HC and PD samples. When not 
otherwise specified, two-tailed p<0.05 was considered significant. Given the exploratory 
nature of this small-sample study, it was decided not to control for family-wise error rate, 
which would have decreased statistical power. To compare mean EASE scores with other 
samples, scores from schizophrenia and bipolar samples were used (Nordgaard & Parnas 
2014),(Raballo & Parnas 2012),(Haug, Lien, et al. 2012). Pearson r was used to analyze the 
correlation between the EASE and CDS scores in the sample. Standard descriptive statistics 
were employed to determine the ASE items percentage profile in the subjects. All analyses 
were performed using SPSS IBM 22.  
Since previous studies considering depersonalization disorder (Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 
2013) and introspectionism (Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013) were quasi-empirical, they do 
not allow for direct comparisons with these PD findings (as noted above, in these studies 
EASE categories were applied not to interviews but to previously published reports). They 
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do, however, allow for comparing items that seem to be especially rare outside 
schizophrenia — as explained below. 
4. Results
4.1 Socio-demographic characterization 
Interviews (EASE+CDS): took on average 1h16min (SD=0.31) in HC and 2h23 min 
(SD=0.39) in PD subjects.  
4.2 Prevalence of ASE and average EASE scores 
ASEs, as measured by the EASE, were present in all 47 of the PD subjects, with an average 
EASE score (mean ± SD) of 17.94±11.88, largely reflecting domains 1 and 2. Mean ASE 
scores of individual EASE domains were: 1) Cognition and Stream of thought: 6.53±4.4; 2) 
Self-experience: 8.68±6.02; 3) Bodily experiences: 1.32±2.11, 4) Demarcation/transitivism: 
0.26±0.49; and 5) Existential reorientation: 0.70±1.317.  
In the comparison sample of 47 HD subjects, ASEs occurred in 20 subjects; of these, 16 had 
scores below 5, with a maximum of 8 (in one subject). The average HD EASE score was 
1.00±1.72.  
We found a significant difference in EASE scores overall, as well as in each specific domain 
(somewhat surprisingly, given the lower scores for domains 4 and 5).  Table 10 presents’ 
between-groups differences in EASE and SOFAS scores. Figure 5 offers a boxplot 
representation of EASE overall score in HC and PD samples. 
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Table 10: Between groups differences in EASE and SOFAS scores 
 
Two groups were compared and considering the non-normal distribution of data and heterogeneity of variance, 
the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test was adopted. Median (with range) and mean rank for each group are 
reported. P values correspond to differences between the two groups. Abbreviations: HC: Healthy controls; 
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Figure 5: Distribution of EASE Scores in HC and Panic Disorder samples 
The two groups differed for total EASE score (N=94, H(2)=66.271, p<0.001) 
4.3 Correlation between EASE and CDS scores 
Not surprisingly, it confirmed the prediction of a significant correlation between CDS 
depersonalization and derealization scores and overall EASE scores in the sample (see 
Figure 6), with Pearson r=0.756, 95% CI 0.665-0.840, p<0.001. Correlations of CDS scores 
with domains 1, 2 and 3 scores were especially high (respectively 0.736, 95% 0.637-0.835, 
p<0.001; 0.688, 95% 0.518-0.815, p<0.005; and 0.658 0.451-0.800, p<0.005).  
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Figure 6: Correlation between EASE and CDS score in the sample 
(r=0.756, 95% CI 0.665-0.840, p<0.001 bootstrap method applied) 
 
4.4 Distribution (percentages) of individual EASE sub-items in the PD sample  
As shown in Table 11, certain EASE items or sub-items were especially common in the PD 
sample. The most frequently items (i.e., reported by >50% of PD subjects) were: Thought 
pressure (1.3), ruminations subtype 1 (1.6.1), Disturbance of time experience Subtype 1 and 
2 (1.14.1 and 1.14.2); as well as (not surprisingly) assorted anxiety experiences including 
panic attacks with autonomous symptoms (2.13.1), psychic mental anxiety (2.13.2) phobic 
anxiety (2.13.3), and social anxiety (2.13.4).  
Also of interest are “discrepancies”—namely, EASE items presumably found in 
schizophrenia-spectrum subjects but either absent or rare (<10%) in the panic-disorder 
sample. Only two EASE items were never reported by the PD subjects: namely, 
Perceptualization of inner speech: as external (1.7.4) and Sense of change in relation to 
gender: fear of being of the opposite sex (2.11.1). Also of interest are a considerable number 
of items and sub-items (32) that were rarely reported (<10% of the sample), for these may 
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suggest significant deviance from the schizophrenia-spectrum patients on which the EASE 
is based. They are presented in Table 12, which also shows, for comparative purposes, the 
“discrepancies” (vis a vis schizophrenia-spectrum) found in prior, quasi-empirical studies of 
Depersonalization Disorder and of Introspectionism (reminder: “discrepancy” refers to 
EASE items, presumably characteristic of schizophrenia, that were not found in published 
reports of the latter two conditions).  
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Table 11: Distribution of EASE items and sub-items according to their percentage 




Cognition and Stream of 
Consciousness domain 
Self-Awareness   domain 
Bodily Experiences 
domain 
Transitivism    
Domain 
Existential       
domain 
<10% 
1.4.2 Thought fading; 1.4.3 
Thought Combination; 1.5 
Silent Thought Eco; 1.8 
Spatialization of 
experience; 1.7.2 1.7.3 
1.7.4: perceptualization of 
inner speech: equivalents 
and internal as first rank 
symptoms and as external 
1.10 Inability to 
discriminate modalities of 
intentionality 1.11 
Disturbance of thought 
initiative; 
2.1.2 Diminished sense of basic 
Self from adolescence; 2.2.3 
Spatialization of the self; 2.7.1 
2.7.3 I-split: as if and as a 
spatialized experience; 2.11.1 
Fear of being of the opposite 
sex; 2.18.2 diminished vitality 
trait like;  
3.1.1 3.1.2 Sensation 
and Perception of 
change 3.2.3 Mirror 
related: other; 3.4 
Psychophysical Misfit / 
Split; 3.5 body 
disintegration; 3.6 
Spatialization of bodily 
experiences; 3.8.1 3.8.2 
3.8.3 3.8.4 Pseudo-
movements and motor 
interference motor 
blocking and sense of 
motor paresis; 3.9 
mimetic experience;  
4.1 confusion 
with the other; 4.2 
confusion with 
specular image; 
4.3.2 feeling of 
fusion/disappeara






5.3 Feeling as 
if his 
experiential 
field is the 
only extant 
reality; 5.4 











1.12.2 Inability to split 
attention; 
2.1 Diminished sense of basic 
Self: early life; 2.2.1 Distorted 
mineness/selfhood; 2.4.2 
Distance to the world 2.4.3 
Diminished presence with 
derealization; 2.5.2 Intrusive 
derealization; 2.8.2 Dissociative 
visual hallucination; 2.10 Sense 
of change in Chronological age; 
2.11.1 Fear of being 
homosexual; 2.12 loss of 
common sense; 
3.2.1 3.2.2 Mirror-
related search for 
change or perception of 









5.2 feeling of 
centrality; 5.6 
magical ideas 












Captivation by details; 
2.2.2 Experiential distance in 
perspective; 2.4.1 Diminished 
presence: not being affected; 
2.6 Hyperreflectivity; 2.7.1 I-
split suspected; 2.9 Identity 
confusion; 2.15 diminished 
transparency of consciousness; 




5.5 Feeling as 
if the world is 
not truly real; 
30-
40% 
1.4.1 Thought blocking 
1.6.5 Rituals/Compulsions; 
1.7 Perceptualization of 
inner speech: internal, 1.13 
Disorder of short term 
memory; 1.15 
discontinuous awareness of 
action; 1.16 Discordance 
expression/expressed; 1.17 
Disturbance of language; 
2.3.1 2.3.2 Depersonalization; 
melancholiform and unspecified 
forms 2.14 ontological Anxiety; 
2.17 hypohedonia 
   
40-
50% 
1.1 Thought Interference; 
1.6.3 True obsessions; 
2.5.1 Fluid global derealization; 
2.8.1 Dissociative 
depersonalization: “as if”; 
2.13.5 Diffuse free floating 
anxiety; 2.18.1 diminished 
vitality state like; 2.13.3 phobic 
anxiety; 2.13.6 paranoid anxiety 
   
>50% 
1.3 Thought Pressure; 1.6.1 
Pure Rumination; 1.14.1 
disturbance in subjective 
time; 1.14.2 disturbance in 
existential time; 
2.13.1 Panic Attacks with 
autonomic symptoms; 2.13.2 
Psychic mental anxiety; 2.13.4 
Social Anxiety; 
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Table 12: “Discrepancies” in the EASE in Depersonalization, Introspectionism and 










1.1 Thought interference; 
1.5 Silent Thought Echo; 
1.13 Disorder of short-
term memory; 2.10 Sense 
of change in 
chronological age; 2.11 
Sense of change in 
gender; 3.9 Mimetic 
experience 4.1 Confusion 
with the other; 4.2 
Confusion with own 
specular image; 5.1 
Primary self-reference 
phenomena; 5.2 Feelings 
of centrality; 5.3; Feeling 
as if experiential field is 
only extant reality; 5.6 








function; 2.9 Identity 
confusion; 2.10 Sense of 
change in relation to 
chronological age; 2.11 
gender; 2.18 diminished 
vitality; 3.5 Bodily 
disintegration; 3.9 and 
Mimetic experience; 
4.3.2 feeling of 
fusion/disappearance 
with physical contact; 
5.7 existential change 
and 5.8 solipsistic 
grandiosity  
1.4.2 Thought fading; 1.4.3 Thought Combination; 1.5 Silent 
Thought Eco; 1.8 Spatialization of experience; 1.7.2 1.7.3 
1.7.4: perceptualization of inner speech: equivalents and 
internal as first rank symptoms and as external 1.10 Inability 
to discriminate modalities of intentionality 1.11 Disturbance 
of thought initiative; 2.1.2 Diminished sense of basic Self 
from adolescence; 2.2.3 Spatialization of the self; 2.7.1 2.7.3 
I-split: as if and as a spatialized experience; 2.11.1 Fear of
being of the opposite sex; 2.18.2 diminished vitality trait like;
3.1.1 3.1.2 Sensation and Perception of change 3.2.3 Mirror
related: other; 3.4 Psychophysical Misfit / Split; 3.5 body
disintegration; 3.6 Spatialization of bodily experiences; 3.8.1
3.8.2 3.8.3 3.8.4 Pseudo-movements and motor interference
motor blocking and sense of motor paresis; 3.9 mimetic
experience; 4.1 confusion with the other; 4.2 confusion with
specular image; 4.3.2 feeling of fusion/disappearance with
physical contact; 4.4 passivity mood; 4.5 Other transitivistic
phenomena; 5.3 Feeling as if his experiential field is the only
extant reality; 5.4 Feeling as if having an extraordinary
creative power; 5.7 Existential or intellectual change;
* For Depersonalization and Introspectionism, “discrepancy” means – not reported at all; while for the (more extensively
probed) Panic-Disorder sample, it means – <10% of subjects reported the item. The items presented for Depersonalization
Disorder and for Introspectionism are from (Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 2013) and from (Sass, Pienkos & Nelson 2013),
respectively.
5. Discussion
This is the first empirical investigation of ASE in Panic Disorder. The chief aim was to 
determine whether ASEs — previously reported mostly in schizophrenia-spectrum patients 
— were present in significant amounts in PD subjects vs in matched controls. Also of interest 
are the possible differences between the ASE profiles of PD versus schizophrenia spectrum. 
5.1 ASEs prominent in Panic Disorder subjects (affinities): 
Overall EASE scores were, in fact, much higher in the PD group than in the normal (HC) 
sample, with a significant difference also for each of the five EASE domains. This mainly 
reflects high scores in the first three domains. It is noteworthy, however, that although scores 
on “demarcation/transitivism” and “Existential Reorientation” were quite low, they too were 
significantly different from HC. 
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As noted, 27 healthy-control subjects (HC) reported no ASE experiences (vs zero for the PD 
sample). Of the 20 HC subjects who did report some ASE, 16 had scores of 4 or less (4 
subjects had scores between 5-8) — a finding consistent with previously studied 
samples(Sass 2014; Nelson, A. Thompson & Yung 2013; Raballo et al. 2011)). It is 
noteworthy that comparable previous research studies (using a standardized EASE 
technique) showed an average EASE score in schizophrenia-spectrum patients of 25.3 
(Haug, Melle, et al. 2012), 21.4 (Raballo & Parnas 2012) and 19.6 (Nordgaard & Parnas 
2014), p<0.05. The PD scores—average score of 17.94±11.88 — are somewhat lower than 
these, but considerably higher than those reported for bipolar psychosis (average of 6.3, 
p<0.05) and other mental disorders (average of 8.1, p<0.05) in the just-cited comparative 
studies. 
If replicated, the finding that ASEs can be prominent in anxiety and in Panic Disorder, 
outside actual Panic Attacks, has significant psychopathological implications. Though the 
subjects’ ASEs could be argued to be secondary to their Panic Attacks, they seem generally 
to reflect longer-term features of personality. The EASE interview does require that the items 
considered positive be pervasive, continuous and relevant to subjects ongoing well-being. 
Indeed, it is quite possible that ASEs might play a role in creating the anxious situations or 
orientation in which Panic Attacks could ensue. It is noteworthy that a number of PD subjects 
did describe their ASE experiences as lifelong but it is also significant that some of such 
patients felt they had had panic attacks since early in life, long before they were diagnosed.  
As noted in Table 3, thought Pressure (1.3), pure Rumination (1.6.1), and disturbance of 
time experience in subjective time (1.14.1) as well as in existential time (1.14.2) were all 
highly common in PD subjects (>50%). The first two experiences are already considered in 
the standard anamnesis of anxiety. The findings suggest that altered time experience might 
be another key aspect of subjectivity –of much disregarded set of phenomena in need of 
being studied(Nordgaard et al. 2013). And as noted, the EASE findings regarding thought 
process and self-experience show that panic-disorder patients can often experience persistent 
and longstanding changes in thought process and assorted dissociative, de-realization and 
depersonalization experiences.  
Not surprisingly, given the above-mentioned overlapping of items, high correlation between 
the EASE and CDS was found in this PD sample—a result consistent with finding frequent 
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derealization and depersonalization experiences in a previous UHR sample(Madeira, 
Bonoldi, Rocchetti, Brandizzi, et al. 2016).  
Regarding the finding of significant levels of ASE in the panic disorder subjects, at least 
three possibilities must be considered (1) ASE in PD and in schizophrenia-spectrum might 
be the same phenomena, with severe anxiety the common denominator; (2) ASE in PD and 
schizophrenia-spectrum might be only superficially similar, though the EASE interview is 
unable to distinguish them; (3) somewhat different clusters of ASE might occur in 
schizophrenia-spectrum vs in Panic Disorder, such that close examination of EASE findings 
might be able to identify these distinct patterns.  
We now consider the rarity of certain ASEs in panic disorder, a finding that would seem 
supportive of the third possibility. 
5.2 ASEs rare in Panic Disorder (discrepancies): 
Close examination of individual EASE items in this PD sample does allow us to identify 
some distinctive features of the panic-disorder ASE profile, for there are certain ASEs—
presumably characteristic of schizophrenia-spectrum—that seem absent or rare (<10% of 
the subjects) in PD. These rare or absent ASEs can be grouped and labeled as follows: 
1) A profoundly diminished sense of self-presence: “diminished sense of basic Self from
adolescence” (2.1.2), “loss of first Person Perspective” (2.2), “diminished vitality trait-like” 
(item 2.18.2),  
2) A loss of the sense of existing as an independent entity: “confusion with the other” (4.1)
and “feelings of fusion” (4.3). 
3) Solipsistic experiences of being the center of the universe: “feeling that the experiential
field is only reality” (5.3) 
4) Extreme reifications of subjective life: spatialization of experience (1.8), spatialization of
self (2.2.3), “I-split as a spatialized experience” (2.7.3), Spatialization of bodily experiences 
(3.6); and Perceptualization of inner speech: equivalents, internal as first rank symptom and 
external (1.7.2, 1.7.3 and 1.7.4, the latter is 0%). 
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All these items (rarely reported in the PD sample) would seem to suggest a profound 
distortion of the normal “transcendental” conditions of consciousness (in a Kantian sense—
i.e., as concerning the very constitution of subjective life). It has been suggested that they 
may be related, on the neurobiological plane, to forms of basic perceptual dys-integration 
that have been found in persons prone to schizophrenia—forms involving a failure to 
synthesize different modalities of perception, especially exteroceptive and 
interoceptive(Borda & Sass 2015). By contrast, the anomalous self experiences commonly 
found in PD would be largely of a different kind, probably involving more “secondary” and 
defensive phenomena including more standard forms of depersonalization and 
derealization(Sass & Borda 2015). 
In this light, it is worth noting the rarity, even in severe Panic Disorder, of items in the 
Existential-Reorientation domain that would suggest one of the following: major changes of 
general metaphysical perspective (item 5.7), quasi-solipsistic views regarding one’s own 
unusual creative powers (item 5.4) or one’s status as the center of existence (item 5.2), or 
the sense that one’s experiential field is the only extant reality (item 5.3). The rarity of these 
items suggests that even severe PD patients are unlikely to depart radically from standard 
metaphysical assumptions or a shared inter-subjective orientation, perhaps reflecting a less 
extreme alteration of the most basic coordinates of experience.  
A final set of items rare in the PD sample is somewhat more difficult to interpret. These 
items, apparently associated with some formal disorder of thought process, are “thought 
fading” (1.4.2), “thought combination” (1.4.3), and “disturbance of thought initiative” 
(1.11). Their scarcity in the subjects suggest that thought process in anxious subjects does 
not typically manifest the kind of weakening or blurring, of initiative or clarity of theme, 
suggested by these items. Yet by contrast, “thought interference” (item 1.1: >40%) and 
“thought blocking” (sub-item 1.4.1: >30%) were quite common; these latter may reflect a 
more choppy quality to the flow of thought in panic patients, perhaps involving invasions by 
unwanted thoughts and also evasions of needed thoughts. Though speculative, it is possible 
that closer qualitative examination of patient reports might reveal differences between panic-
related halting or block of thinking versus what seems a more extreme blocking and 
perplexity characteristic of schizophrenia (“suddenly my head became empty when speaking 
or thinking,” said one such patient, “I was lost and could not go back”).  
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The resemblances of the results to “discrepancies” previously identified in 
Depersonalization Disorder and Introspectionism seem particularly noteworthy. As can be 
seen in Table 4, items rarest in the PD group, including indications of fusion and of 
solipsistic centrality, also tended to be absent in these previous studies of non-schizophrenia-
spectrum subjects. Together these results suggest that, while schizophrenia might entail 
deeply grounded disturbance of the self (perhaps involving perceptual dysintegration, at the 
pre-reflective level of self-experience) or a longer-term dys-social orientation, such 
abnormalities tend to be less prominent, or even absent, in Panic Disorder, Depersonalization 
Disorder, and Introspectionism. The ASEs that are present suggest a 
depersonalization/derealization syndrome that might be more secondary or defensive in a 
pathogenetic sense(Sass & Borda 2015). 
Overall, the findings support the ipseity-disturbance or basic-self disturbance model of 
schizophrenia(Sass & Parnas 2003), while also indicating the need for careful 
phenomenological exploration of possible types or qualities of self-anomalies in order to 
distinguish trans-nosological “psychotic-like phenomena” from those of true psychotic or 
schizophrenic conditions.  
It is striking, nevertheless, that, though rare (<10%), most of the more severe ASEs were not 
entirely absent from the PD sample. It is difficult to know how to interpret this finding. One 
possibility is that there can be an occasional potential, within Panic Disorder itself, for some 
quite severe disruptions of the transcendental conditions or fundamental constitution of the 
self or the self/world relationship—disruptions that might sometimes be indistinguishable 
from schizophrenia. Still another explanation might postulate the presence, in some PD 
subjects, of subclinical schizotypal or other psychosis-prone traits that were not detected in 
the screening process; the severe nature of the PD patients—a sample being treated in a 
hospital setting – might make this more likely. A third possibility is that here there is a form 
of error variance that is perhaps inherent in any interviewing technique that elicits verbal 
reports intended to target such subtle levels of subjective life. These possibilities should all 
be considered in discussing the remaining, miscellaneous ASEs found in this sample.  
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5.3 ASEs with mid-range distribution in Panic Disorder: 
The presence of the remaining ASEs in percentages ranging from 10-50% (see Table 11) do 
suggest that disturbances in subjectivity in persons prone to “Panic attacks” may be more 
heterogeneous, and potentially severe, than previously assumed. Question remains on the 
nature of this heterogeneity and its clinical implications. First, and along with the presence 
of more severe ASE, it is possible that diverse personality traits in the PD subjects might 
account for their differences in respect to ASE (e.g. subjects with schizoid and schizotypal 
traits would have higher ASE). It could also be considered that these represent patients also 
constitute unrecognized UHR subjects and that time will reveal a different diagnosis (e.g. 
schizophrenia). Indeed, both might help to explain why the patients were unresponsive to 
their initial psychopharmacological treatment (at least one-month trial of SSRIs—standard 
in Portugal), and were referred to a hospital setting, sometimes including use of anti-
psychotics (e.g. quetiapine in 23% of patients). Perhaps an inquiry into ASE in the initial 
evaluation could have predicted their unresponsiveness to standardized treatment and their 
need for a tailored approach. 
But also, the prominence of depersonalization/derealization phenomena in both PD and 
schizophrenia spectrum seems clear indicating the need for a careful phenomenological 
exploration of possible differences between the types or quality of (1) self anomalies 
especially characteristic of or specific to schizophrenia (e.g. extreme or “bizarre” 
phenomena affecting the fundamental structure of consciousness in its relationship to its 
world) versus (2) more widespread, unspecified depersonalization and derealization 
experiences. Such research could be relevant to refining the ASE for assessing factors for 
psychosis (and schizophrenia) in vulnerable adolescents. More generally, it might help 
distinguish psychotic-like experiences in the general population from those more 
characteristic of true psychotic conditions. 
6. Limitations 
The sample came from a single psychiatric clinic (CHLN) with specific selection processes 
and criteria; all the PD patients were hospitalized, indicating severe presentation of anxiety 
or recalcitrance to the standard treatment. This, together with the small sample size. limits 
the generalizability of the results. Also, despite the absence of personality-disorder 
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diagnoses in the clinical records, it is not possible to exclude that some of the subjects might 
have traits of schizoid/schizotypal personality disorders (see discussion).  
Specific limitations include the significant differences in employment rates and in level of 
education across the HC and PD samples. The first discrepancy reflects the process of 
selection of the HC group, which was by advertisement in a hospital, with recruited subjects 
necessarily being “working staff”. The second seems also artefactual, given that PD subjects 
were hospitalized patients, which is generally associated with a lower level of functioning. 
Lastly, the small sample size did not allow for determining the effect of drugs and alcohol 
in the overall scores. 
7. Partial Synthesis
To the knowledge, this is the first study to explore prevalence and implications of ASE in 
subjects with PD. All the PD subjects (a hospitalized sample) did report ASEs with an 
average score considerably higher than previously found in bipolar psychosis and other (non-
schizophrenic) mental disorders, but lower than in schizophrenia-spectrum samples. 
Together with finding a significant correlation between EASE and CDS scores, this suggests 
the need to further explore the differences as well as similarities between ASE associated 
with psychosis or schizophrenia and the depersonalization and derealization experiences 
more broadly found. The detailed probing of ASE revealed both “affinities” and 
“discrepancies” between the PD profile and that of schizophrenia. This, considered together 
with similar findings in studies of depersonalization and introspectionism samples, suggests 
that future research on self-disorders might attempt to identify specific sets more 
differentiating of schizophrenia (perhaps a “schizophrenic spectrum disorders cluster”). The 
study also furthers the knowledge of subjective phenomena characteristic of anxiety 
disorders. All this might help to improve diagnostic identification, prognostic prediction, 
and pathogenetic modeling in both anxiety disorders and schizophrenia spectrum. Future 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion and Conclusions 
1. General Discussion
This thesis is part of the current phenomenological effort to retrieve meaning of subjective 
experiences in the landscapes of diagnosis, treatment of Schizophrenia and Anxiety 
disorders. Since the DSM-III the search for reliability has favored objective symptoms and 
operational categories stipulating a simplistic approach to the complexity of human 
experience and grounding various validity claims (Insel 2009; Kendall 2011; Naber & 
Lambert 2009; Parnas et al. 2013; Tandon 2014; Tyrer & Kendall 2009) and rendering a 
psychopathology and a nosology with severe limitations. More particularly, the thesis is set 
on the problematic topic of finding the core of schizophrenia – today a heterogeneous 
category built up by various consensuses (Andreasen 2006; de Leon 2013; Kendler 2009; 
Stanghellini & Fusar-Poli 2012) and with great variation in presenting symptoms and course 
of illness (Silveira et al. 2012; Silverstein et al. 2014; Tandon et al. 2009; Tandon 2014). It 
is here that the paradigm of anomalous self-experiences (ASE) can be drawn from seminal 
contributions ((Conrad 1997),(Jaspers 1963)) and also up-to-date clinical (e.g. (Parnas, 
Moller, et al. 2005; Parnas, Handest, et al. 2005; Sass et al. 2011)) and translational studies 
(e.g. (Borda & Sass 2015; Sass & Borda 2015; Hur et al. 2014)). The nature of basic-self 
disturbances as “traits” grounded the model beyond the occurrence in patients with psychosis 
and schizophrenia into their presence in prodromal and Ultra-High-Risk Subjects (e.g. 
(Brent et al. 2014; Nelson et al. 2008; Nelson et al. 2012)). Indeed, and after these 
developments, new clusters of symptoms have emerged and are being tested as markers of 
psychosis such as the Truman Symptoms (Fusar-Poli, Howes, et al. 2008) and Abnormal 
bodily Experiences (Stanghellini et al. 2012). 
Yet the general introduction of these new clinical components (including its addition to the 
psychopathological examination) benefits from more studies (Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, et al. 
2013) on the phenomenological bearing of these experiences. This constitutes the particular 
of this thesis which probes the boundaries of anomalous self-experiences in UHR subjects 
and anxiety disorders (particularly Panic Disorder). First, it takes the new concept of 
“Truman Symptoms” as a new way of rendering ASE in UHR. Secondly, it further details 
the subset of bodily ASE in UHR subjects by the use of a new Questionnaire of Anomalous 
Bodily Phenomena (ABPq). Lastly, it examines basic-self disorders in Panic Disorder both 
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illuminating the (yet) mysterious phenomenology of subjective experience in anxious 
disorders and to further substantiate the possibility of clusters of ASE, some with greater 
bearing for schizophrenia spectrum patients while others accompany anxious settings.  
The first arm of this thesis rendered the prevalence and specifity of TS in a UHR 
sample suggesting that they might be a phenotypic marker of this state. It raised the argument 
that TS might be a UHR “symptom” and a protagonist in identifying a subgroup of UHR 
subjects that have higher psychopathology. It also showed there was no relation between 
basic-self disturbances or Depersonalization scores and Truman symptoms – yet was 
speculated that it might represent a false negative due to the small sample size. The findings 
of a high correlation between Cambridge Depersonalization Scale and Examination of 
Anomalous Self Experiences add up to the the sharp need of segregating “basic self-
disturbances” from unspecified depersonalization and derealization experiences. A full 
overlap would render narratives of general derealization and depersonalization experiences 
an important confounding factor to narratives suggesting disturbances of “basic-self” (and 
schizophrenia proneness). 
On the arm on Abnormal Bodily Phenomena the UHR sample experienced Abnormal 
Bodily Phenomena, and half of the sample experiencing them prominently – raising the 
speculation that these might be phenotypic markers of psychosis vulnerability. Still, as much 
as 30% of the sample had no ABP fostering the heterogeneity of the HR states, which present 
various comorbidities and have diverse diagnostic and functional outcomes. Indeed, it 
suggested that the ABP questionnaire might assess phenomena unlike other criteria defining 
HR for psychosis (including bodily phenomena considered in the CAARMS). The presence 
of prominent ABP did not differentiate the HR sample across PANSS and SOFAS scores 
and that proABP subjects had lower CAARMS overall score. These results could respond 
for a weak statistical power due to small group size in each group and further studies with 
larger samples are need to clarify this issue. In this sample it was found that subjects referring 
prominent ABP did not have significantly higher EASE scores.  
Lastly, the findings in the sample of Panic Disorder subjects demonstrated that they 
experience basic-self disturbances and that their scores are considerably higher than those 
reported for bipolar psychosis and other mental disorders in the comparative studies. At least 
three possibilities were considered (1) ASE in PD and in Schizophrenic Psychosis might be 
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the same phenomena, with severe anxiety the common denominator; (2) ASE in PD and 
schizophrenic psychosis might be only superficially similar, though the EASE interview is 
unable to distinguish them; (3) somewhat different clusters of ASE might occur in 
schizophrenic Psychosis vs Panic Disorder, such that close examination might be able to 
identify these distinct patterns. This research allowed the verification that many ASEs are 
rare (<10% of subjects) in Panic Disorder, particularly those that correspond to a profound 
distortion of subjective life related, on the neurobiological plane, to some forms of basic 
perceptual dys-integration that have been found in persons prone to schizophrenia. By 
contrast, the anomalous self experiences found in Panic Disorder could be largely of a 
different kind, probably involving more “secondary” and defensive phenomena and standard 
forms of depersonalization and derealization. 
A major inference of the analysis of the PD sample are that greater detail into their 
phenomenology suggests the differentiation of specific expressions of anxiety that were, 
until today, concealed. It could be possible to speculate that such insight into traits and 
features of PD (to which Psychiatry was previously oblivious) could explain why the patients 
were unresponsive to their initial psychopharmacological treatment and were referred to a 
hospital setting. Indeed, the enquiry of ASE in their initial evaluation could have directly 
pointed their unresponsiveness to standardized treatment and their need for a tailored 
approach. Lastly, and along the results in the UHR sample, there was a high correlation 
between the ASE (EASE) and Depersonalization scores (CDS) in the PD sample. Given the 
overlapping of items this is not surprising and yet raises the need of carefully addressing 
their distinction at phenomenological level.  
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2. General Limitations 
This study is limited by the small sample sizes to the point that two of its branches should 
be considered exploratory. This limitation together with the use of just two UHR clinics and 
the selection process should warn that these results could be false negatives or false positives. 
Other important limitations include the lack of follow up results and of a clinical control 
group (e.g. affective, anxious or personality disorders) both would help to better define the 
clinical relevance of TS and ABP in UHR and ASE in PD. Particularly (1) in the UHR 
sample – the conceptual and empirical heterogeneity of criteria can impair the use of the 
results and (2) in sample of Panic Disorder it is not possible to exclude traits of 
schizoid/schizotypal personality disorders which can tamper with the results (and 
comparison with schizophrenia samples). Lastly, use of prescribed drugs and of illicit 
substances was either not systematically appraised (UHR) or their effect cannot be 
determined due to small numbers (PD sample). 
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3. Conclusion and answers to research questions
3.1 Final Conclusion 
Overall, these studies spread the understanding of anomalous self-experiences outside 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders studying their relevance as markers of risk of severe 
mental disorders and their possible status in anxiety disorders. First, that Truman Symptoms 
might occur in Ultra-High-Risk (UHR) subjects endorse the need of their enquiry and 
finding if they predict clinical outcomes. Possibly they display a contemporary way of 
formulating Anomalous Self Experiences (ASE) in UHR states. Second, Abnormal Bodily 
Phenomena might be a relevant psychopathological cluster in Ultra-High-Risk Subjects. 
Therefore, that a comprehensive phenomenological inquiry of this subset of ASE could be 
relevant to enrich the understanding of UHR states. Third, a cluster of “secondary” ASE 
emerged in subjects with Panic Disorder allowing the identification of new 
psychopathological particularities of this category. The results in Panic Disorder expose how 
these subjects lack more profound disturbances of basic self, which are present in 
schizophrenia. Notably, they illuminate the yet unmapped field of subjective phenomena, 
which might carry new meanings to the psychopathological examination. 
All three branches of this thesis provided a critical appraisal of basic-self paradigm. 
Furthering the knowledge on the subjective experiences in anxious disorders and UHR, it 
provided insight into their subjective self-experiences and detail into the “disparities” and 
“affinities” that these subjects present vs schizophrenia. Fostering the specificity of ASE for 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders or identifying particular subsets is of key relevance for the 
use of this model in adolescence and Ultra-High-Risk subjects. Indeed in these situations, 
anxiety is very frequent and could account for psychotic-like experiences or derealisation 
and depersonalization experiences – similes of ASE and therefore a confounding element.  
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3.2 Answers to research questions 
3.2.1 Question 1: Are TS present in subjects at Ultra High clinical risk for psychosis 
and are they a valid clinical construct with impact in UHR psychopathology?  
TS were prevalent in in the UHR sample and were absent in matched HC’s. The 
UHR subjects with TS had similar scores to the UHR without TS in the EASE, 
SOFAS, CDS, CAARMS, PANSS, with the exception of higher score on Existential 
Reorientation and Demarcation/transitivism EASE subscales and General 
Psychopathology PANSS subscale. Further studies are necessary to understand the 
impact on UHR psychopathology 
3.2.2 Question 2: Is there a correlation between CDS and EASE scores? 
In the UHR and Panic disorder samples the CDS and EASE scores were correlated. 
This is not surprising as many of the items in the CDS are more or less identical with 
EASE items, 13 by estimation, while others show a close affinity here, 11 estimated 
(though this involves matters of interpretation). A recent research track raised the 
worry that the constructs of derealisation and depersonalization and basic self-
disturbances could overlap. This correlation carries a first hint into the need of a 
phenomenological exploration of possible types or qualities of self-anomalies in 
order to distinguish trans-nosological depersonalization and derealization 
phenomena from ASE of true psychotic or schizophrenic conditions. 
3.2.3 Question 3: Are Abnormal Bodily Phenomena (ABP) present in a UHR sample 
and does their presence carry clinical implications? 
ABP were highly prevalent (while absent from matched HC) and there were 
prominent ABP in 50% of Panic Disorder subjects. ABP could be a phenotypic 
component of HR psychopathology and particularly of a subgroup of these subjects. 
Future prospective, and with larger samples, studies are necessary before endorsing 
the considerations if ABP predicts clinical outcomes or treatment response in HR 
subjects. 
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3.2.4 Question 4: Are Anomalous Self-Experiences (ASE) present in a Panic Disorder 
(PD) sample and what are the “discrepancies” and “affinities” with schizophrenia 
scores? 
All the PD subjects reported ASEs with an average score considerably higher than 
previously found non-schizophrenic samples. It supports the need to further explore 
the differences as well as similarities between ASE associated with psychosis or 
schizophrenia and the depersonalization and derealization experiences more broadly 
found. The detailed probing of ASE allowed the display of “affinities” and 
“discrepancies” between the PD profile and that of schizophrenia suggesting that 
there might be specific sets more differentiating of schizophrenia (perhaps a 
“schizophrenic spectrum disorders cluster”). The study also furthers the knowledge 
of subjective phenomena characteristic of anxiety disorders. All this might help to 
improve diagnostic identification, prognostic prediction, and pathogenetic modeling 
in both anxiety disorders and schizophrenia spectrum. Future prospective and large-
sample studies would be necessary to confirm the initial findings and speculations.  
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